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As U.S. Defense budgets and military research and development spending 
experienced significant decline between 1988 and 1998, the Defense Technology and 
Industrial Base essentially merged with the national industrial base.  DOD reform 
occurred more slowly than changes in the private sector fueled by advances in 
technology.  U.S. national security relies upon the ability of the military to maintain 
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not participate in defense business to the defense market, Congress provided a new 
contracting authority, Section 845 Other Transaction Authority (OTA).  This study 
examines the effectiveness of its byproduct, Section 845 Other Transactions (OTs).  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. GENERAL  
 A dramatic decrease in U.S. defense spending since the end of the cold war 
coupled with private industry's incredible economic boom presents a unique problem for 
the Department of Defense (DOD).  As DOD’s purchases have declined, commercial 
markets have expanded, reducing DOD’s spending role as a driving force for 
technological innovation. [Ref. 1: p. A20]  During the Cold War era, a robust Defense 
Technology Industrial Base and DOD’s seemingly unlimited budget for "in-house" 
research represented the bulk of the world's advanced science, research and technology 
efforts.  What typically occurred during this era was that DOD would first identify the 
need for and develop “leading edge” science and technology innovations.  Then this 
military technology would find its way into a commercial application and therefore, into 
private industry, ultimately forming the basis for commercial technological advancement.  
This process was referred to as “spinoff.”  [Ref. 2: p. 13] 
Today, this scenario has reversed.  Except in a few select areas, the Department of 
Defense no longer dominates advanced technology.  [Ref. 2: p. 13]  Many “leading edge” 
commercial technologies are being developed, fielded and deployed by private industry 
well in advance of DOD’s requirements for the same technology.  When DOD absorbs 
technology developed in the private sector, it is referred to as “spinon.”   
In today’s tight defense funding environment, this role reversal has made it even 
more critical that DOD partner with industry in order to leverage their commercial 
practices and technological advances.  If the United States is going to continue to lead the 
world’s militaries in exploiting advanced technology and fielding/sustaining superior 
weapon systems, DOD will have to rely more and more upon the commercial industrial 
and technological base.   
While on the surface, this doesn't appear to be much of a problem, nothing can be 
farther from the truth.  A significant share of this technology has been unavailable to 
DOD because the companies who own it are unwilling to do business with the 
Government.  For example, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition 
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Reform), Stan Soloway stated in 1999: “Three quarters of the country’s top 75 or so 
information technology companies won’t do research for the military.”  [Ref. 2: p. 14]  
Additionally, management consultant, Robert Spreng, commented: 
 
A significant share of the most valuable research and development activity in 
commercial companies is virtually unavailable to the Federal Government, 
despite the potential benefits to both parties.  [Ref. 3: p. 3] 
 
  Many studies have since been conducted in an effort to determine why these 
companies are unwilling to do business with DOD.  [Ref. 2: p. 16]  Consequently, the 
researchers have found that there were a variety of reasons why companies chose not to 
do business with the Government. While no simple or single answer could be determined, 
many believe that our Federal Acquisition system as a whole (or at least specific parts of 
it) are what drives private industry away from conducting business with the Government.  
[Ref. 3: p. 1] 
Recognizing the seriousness of the situation, Federal Government Agencies, 
including DOD, have expended significant efforts over the last decade to correct this 
problem.  In fact, much of these efforts have focused on developing innovative “business 
arrangements” that might attract to the Federal Acquisition market companies who 
previously would not do business with the Government (which are commonly referred to 
as “non-traditional” suppliers).  Congress also recognized a need for enhancing the 
flexibility and reducing the burdens of Government funded research and technology 
contracts and in November 1993 included Section 845 in the DOD Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 1994.  [Ref. 2: p. 20]  This legislation released the Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the Services from complying with Federal 
Acquisition statutes and regulations when contracting for prototype R&D projects.  Over 
the next couple of years, this limited release from Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 
compliance evolved into its current form, Other Transaction Authority (OTA).   
The byproduct of OTA, an Other Transaction (OT) is the Government’s common 
phrase for all Title 10 U.S.C. 2371 authority to enter into transactions other than 
contracts, grants, or cooperative agreements.  [Ref. 4: pp. 8]  OTA was initially granted to 
DARPA and the Services as a temporary authority, with the hopes that it would convince 
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these non-traditional suppliers to do business with DOD.  However, in 2000, Congress 
passed Section 803 of the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year (FY) 2001, which extended DOD's ability to use OTA for prototype projects 
through September 30, 2004.  [Ref. 4: Section C1] 
Evidence suggests that DOD immediately embraced this special authority and has 
consistently put it to use ever since it was granted.  For the period from FY 1990 to FY 
1997, DOD issued 210 OTs (for both research and prototype projects) agreements valued 
at just over $3.4 billion. [Ref. 5: p. I] Of the 210 OTs that DOD issued during this period, 
97 were of the Section 845 variety, meaning they were used to pursue prototype project 
development.  It is also interesting to note that DOD’s financial commitment for these 97 
Section 845 OTs totaled $2.6 billion, over three quarters of DOD’s total financial 
commitments based on OTs.  [Ref. 6: p. 1]   
One stipulation to congressional approval of OTA is that DOD is required to 
submit an annual report to Congress on the Department’s usage of OTA for that year (for 
both research and prototype project OTs).  Even though DOD had not been required from 
1994 to 2000 to maintain specific data (outside of the annual Congressional report) or 
track OT performance metrics, there was a largely held belief within DOD that OTs were 
successfully fulfilling their intended use.  In April 2000, GAO conducted a study on 
DOD’s usage of Section 845 OTs and noted the following: 
 
In a February 1999 report to Congress, DOD cited numerous benefits from 
using Section 845 authority; these benefits included attracting firms that 
typically did not contract with DOD (e.g., non-traditional suppliers), 
providing more flexibility to negotiate agreement terms and conditions and 
reducing program costs.  [Ref. 6: p. 1] 
 
While it is true that the requirement for DOD to submit an annual OT usage report 
to Congress has existed since 1994, DOD was not required until FY 2001 to specifically 
track the involvement of non-traditional suppliers as a metric.  In accordance with the 
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (DUSD 
(AT&L)) OT Guide for Prototype Projects, January 2001, any significant contribution 
expected of a non-traditional supplier must be documented in the OT agreement file and 




B. OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH 
The purpose of this thesis is to provide a comprehensive analysis of DOD’s use of 
OTA from 1994 to the present in an effort to determine the extent to which OTs have 
attracted non-traditional suppliers to do business with DOD and thus allowed DOD to tap 
into the private industry R&D and technology base.   
 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Question 
To what extent has Other Transaction Authority (OTA) allowed Department of 
Defense (DOD) to attract non-traditional suppliers and tap into their previously 
unavailable Research and Development (R&D) and technology efforts? 
 
2. Secondary Research Questions 
Additional research questions are as follows: 
What is the trend in DOD’s investment in R&D over the last decade and how 
does it compare to private industry’s investment trends in R&D? 
 
Why is it important that DOD gain greater access to commercial R&D and 
technology resources? 
 
What is the background and history of OTA and how does DOD use it today? 
  
According to DOD, what are the most commonly perceived barriers to attracting 
non-traditional suppliers to the Government Acquisition market?  
 
How do the non-traditional suppliers who have entered into business 
arrangements with DOD using Other Transactions perceive OTA as a means 
for overcoming these barriers? 
 
From the non-traditional supplier’s perspective, what general characteristics 
would a business arrangement need to contain in order to encourage them to 
allow DOD greater access to their R&D and technology efforts? 
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D. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
DOD business agreements based on Title 10 U.S.C. 2371 authority can generally 
be separated into two different types; OTs for Prototype Projects and OTs used to carry 
out basic, applied or advanced research projects.  DOD’s annual report to Congress on 
OT usage includes both types of OTs.  However, it is the researcher’s belief that adequate 
performance data on DOD’s OTs used for basic, applied or advanced research projects 
since 1994 either does not exist or would be too difficult to obtain for the scope of this 
thesis.  For that reason, the researcher chose to limit the scope of this thesis to all OT 
agreements for Prototype Projects made between DOD and non-traditional suppliers from 
Fiscal Years 1994 to 2000.  Additionally, the author applied DUSD (AT&L)’s definition 
of a non-traditional supplier when characterizing OT recipients as either traditional or 
non-traditional.    
To gain a better understanding of the legislative intent behind the development of 
OTA and the environment which OTA was created to address, the researcher first 
reviewed relevant literature, including but not limited to the following: 
 
1. References, publications and electronic media available at the Naval   
Postgraduate School. 
2. Published academic textbooks and research papers. 
3. Internet websites and homepages (both DOD and academic). 
   
To determine the extent to which OTA has allowed DOD to attract non-traditional 
suppliers and thus access previously unavailable parts of private industry’s R&D and 
technology base, the researcher acquired from the DUSD (AT&L)’s office performance 
data on each OT agreement DOD awarded to non-traditional suppliers for prototype 
projects for the period 1994 – 2000.  The analysis involved a survey of all suppliers who 
participated in OTs during this period and were classified by DUSD (AT&L) as non-
traditional.  All respondents were assured of anonymity.  Additionally, telephone 
interviews were conducted with various agreement offices that administered OTs with 
non-traditional suppliers during this period.    The general purpose of the survey was to 
determine the following: 
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1. Was it the OT that attracted these non-traditional suppliers to do business 
with DOD.  Or, would they have done business with DOD regardless of 
whether an OT was used or not? 
2. Were the non-traditional suppliers that DOD conducted business with using 
OT’s the kind that DOD was trying to attract? 
3. If the answer to question # 2 was yes, what percentage of their R&D and 
technology resources did DOD tap into? 
 
 
E. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
The thesis is divided into five chapters.  Chapter I, the introduction, identifies the 
focus and purpose of the thesis, states the primary and secondary research questions and 
discusses the scope of research and the author’s methodology.  Chapter II presents the 
reader with background information on the defense and commercial industrial and 
technology bases since the end of the Cold War.  This chapter also describes the history 
and legislative intent of Other Transactions and provides background on DOD’s use of 
OTA over the last decade.  Chapter III describes the challenges DOD faces while trying 
to attract non-traditional suppliers to the Federal Acquisition market and the importance 
of these efforts.  Chapter IV summarizes background information concerning OT 
performance metrics and analyzes the information collected in the survey.  And finally, 
Chapter V provides the study’s principal conclusions, recommendations, answers to the 
research questions and identifies areas for future study.   
    
F. BENEFITS OF THE STUDY 
This thesis is intended to primarily benefit the drafters and users of Other 
Transaction Authority regulation, which are Department of Defense R&D activities and 
the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics).  A 
critical review of DOD’s success in attracting non-traditional suppliers using OTs could 
yield valuable information about OTA as an innovative business arrangement and 






In an era not long ago, the United States military was the undisputed 
technological leader of the world.  Throughout the last decade, however, this has become 
a heavily disputed belief.  In the era when the U.S. military enjoyed world wide 
technological superiority, defense-related developments led American technology and 
often “spun-off” into the civilian sector, creating products and whole industries.  This 
cycle reflected a U.S. defense posture based on using technical superiority to offset 
whatever advantages potential adversaries might have.  [Ref. 7: p. 3]     
Regardless of which industry, sector, or organization is in fact the technological 
leader of the world today, there is no doubt that the success of the United States’ defense 
rests on a strong, broad, dynamic base of research and development.  Many experts 
believe that a nation’s productive and technological base have and always will be the 
foundation of their entire national power. This is not a new phenomenon. [Ref 8: p. 1]  
Advances in a nation’s technological base can fuel both economic and military 
prosperity.   
What is new, at least for the United States, is the makeup of our technological 
base.  Dramatic changes in the world’s political, economic and security environment over 
the last 10 years have resulted in remarkable transformations in the United States’ 
industrial and technological bases.  The United States’ military is no longer operating in 
the same world that it was a decade ago.  Threats have changed, budgets have changed, 
technological and industrial bases have changed, private industry has changed, and the 
workforce has changed.  All of these changes have profoundly impacted the military’s 
ability to maintain comprehensive technological superiority. 
This chapter provides background information regarding the new environment in 
which DOD operates today and sets the stage for later discussions regarding DOD’s need 
for greater access into the nation’s commercial technological base.  This chapter begins 
by taking a look at the Post-Cold War defense era and the evolution of the U.S. Defense 
Technology Industrial Base in this era.  The researcher will also provide background 
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information on OTA, including its history, general definitions, the congressional intent 
behind it and DOD’s use of OTA since its inception. 
 
B. THE MACRO ENVIRONMENT 
1. The Cold War Defense Era 
During the Cold War, the United States faced a single overarching threat that 
dominated every aspect of our military force planning and strategic thinking.  We lived in 
a bipolar world, divided between the East and the West.  Even though there loomed a 
very real potential for massive world destruction, the bipolarity of the situation actually 
resulted in more clarity and stability for the U.S. military.  There was no question as to 
who the enemy was and relatively little question as to what it was going to take to defeat 
them.  Much like many previous eras in American history, the military relied upon 
technologically superior systems to offset the Soviet Bloc’s numerically larger forces.  
[Ref. 9: p. 1]  U.S. military equipment was meaningfully and undeniably more 
sophisticated than that of the Soviet Union, and our allies sought American technology 
for their own defense efforts.  American companies developed and sold high technology 
products to a world that could not produce them competitively. [Ref. 7: p. 3]   
The Cold War period also saw a profound change in the relationship between 
Government and the industries on which it relied for the production of defense materials.  
A permanent state of war required a “permanent” Defense Industrial Base (DIB).  Most 
of the “cutting edge” R&D efforts were being accomplished by the massive U.S. DIB and 
were focused on fielding superior weapon systems at any cost.  The search for strategic 
and military advantage in the Cold War and the fear of being outpaced by our adversary 
technologically, created a demand by the Government for industry to push the envelope 
of advanced technology in the effort to develop superior weapon systems.  Consequently, 
the Government invested heavily in the creation of a complex system of production 
facilities, depots and laboratories.   
DOD investments in military R&D had little or no civilian application at the time 
they were developed, but represented the major force driving technological innovation in 
the U.S.  Nevertheless, many private industry companies interested in engaging in 
8 
defense-related R&D had little commercial or technological imperative to remain 
entrenched in the broader national industrial base.  [Ref. 10: p. 13]  During the Cold War 
Era, the U.S. essentially had two industrial bases, a Defense Technology and Industrial 
Base and a National Commercial Industrial Base. 
 
2. The Post Cold War Defense Era: A Revolution in Military Affairs 
Few of the Americans alive at the time will ever forget the images of German 
youths hammering away at the Berlin Wall, the single most visible symbol of the end of 
the Cold War.  This event in history marked a global transformation that, over ten years 
later, America is still struggling to fully comprehend.  It was a remarkable time and it 
opened up possibilities previously unimaginable.  But it also replaced the clarity and 
stability of the bipolar world with a less identifiable and less predictable international 
structure.    The end of the Cold War brought forth visions of a less militarized world.  In 
many people’s eyes, these visions were quickly interpreted to mean that substantially 
lower levels of defense spending were now required.  Without the threat of Warsaw Pact 
armored divisions racing across the North German Plain, many thought there would no 
longer be a requirement to maintain military forces of the size and strength justified 
during the Cold War.  [Ref. 11: p. 1] 
Yesterday’s single-minded focus brought on by having a single overarching threat 
has been replaced today by new dangers, such as the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, regional conflict, ethnic violence, and terrorism.   
The security environment we live in is dynamic and uncertain, replete with a 
host of threats and challenges that have the potential to grow deadlier.   We 
are not facing a few disorganized political zealots armed with pistols and 
hand grenades.  Rather, we must defend against well-organized forces armed 
with sophisticated, deadly weapons and access to advanced information 
technology.  They represent a different and difficult challenge to forces 
organized and equipped around traditional missions.   [Ref. 12: p. 1] 
 
As opposed to many of our nation’s citizens who enjoyed an era of stability and 
incredible economic boom during the latter half of the 1990’s, the U.S. military 
encountered an era of incredible uncertainty.  Since the end of the Cold War, the primary 
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question military leaders have faced is how to counter the changing yet uncertain threats 
and keep ahead of any accelerated modernization undertaken by the adversaries that we 
expect to face in the early 21st century.  Or more specifically, what kind of weapons and 
what size force structure will the military require in order to prevail over an unknown 
future enemy?  How much defense is enough in the Post Cold War era? 
Questions such as these sent military leaders and strategists back to the drawing 
board...several times.  Clearly, it was hard to imagine that such uncertainties could be met 
with the same mix of Cold War weapons systems and the same doctrine that the military 
entered the 1990’s with.  One eventual result of the military leaders’ efforts to adapt to 
the post Cold War security environment was what is now commonly referred to as the 
Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)  [Ref. 13: pp. 1-5].   
The RMA is really a generic description for a collection of specific initiatives 
taken by military and Government leaders to revise their visions and strategies.  One of 
the first attempts was the Bottom-Up Review (BUR).  The BUR task forces represented a 
close collaboration between the civilian and military sectors of the DOD.  The purpose of 
the BUR was to seize new opportunities by defining the strategy, force structure, 
modernization programs, industrial base and infrastructure needed to meet the post Cold 
War’s new dangers.    [Ref. 13: pp. 1-5] 
Another significant evolution during the RMA was the development of the 
Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff’s document entitled Joint Vision 2010  [Ref. 9: p. 2].  
Joint Vision 2010 was formulated in response to the Clinton Administration’s 1996 
National Security Strategy.  It was essentially a conceptual template that provided a 
common direction to help the Military Services develop their unique capabilities within a 
joint framework of doctrine and programs.  In this vision, the traditional concepts of 
maneuver, strike, protection and logistics are leveraged with technological advances and 
information superiority to produce improvements that are potentially so powerful that 
they become, in effect, new operational concepts.  [Ref. 9: p. 3]  It was thought by 
military leaders that these new operational concepts would interact to create the powerful, 
synergistic effect of full spectrum dominance, which is defined as the capability to 
dominate an adversary across the full range of military operations.   Joint Vision 2010 
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also stated that in order for the military to achieve full spectrum dominance, it would 
have to combine information superiority with precision weapon delivery, which would 
ultimately result in total battle space situational awareness. 
As the decade wore on, military leaders acted further in the belief that the world 
had become a dangerous place despite the lack of a super power challenger such as the 
Soviet Union.  In 1997, then Secretary of Defense Cohen released his Report of the 
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).  The 1997 QDR recognized many of the positive 
side effects of peace in the Post Cold War Era, but founded its projections on a core 
belief that the world remains a dangerous and highly uncertain place.  Secretary Cohen’s 
projection of the security environment rested on two fundamental assumptions: that the 
U.S. will remain politically and militarily engaged in the world over the next 15 to 20 
years and that it will maintain military superiority over current and potential rivals, 
whomever they are.  Additionally, the 1997 QDR projected that regional dangers will 
continue to exist, the U.S. homeland is not free from external threats, U.S. interests and 
citizens will continue to be challenged and placed at risk and there will be a proliferation 
of advanced weapons and technologies internationally that will increase the danger of 
asymmetric attacks on the U.S.  [Ref. 14: pp. 1-4] 
Much of the difficulty military and Governmental leaders faced during these 
RMA attempts to revise strategy and adapt to the new security environment stemmed 
from the absence of a precedent to build from.  If they agreed on nothing else, military 
leaders agreed on the belief that the U.S. military was now operating in never seen before 
territory.  Only the future can accurately define when the RMA is officially over.  But the 
doctrine and strategy that derived from the potential for an RMA reflected this view of 
DOD capabilities: 
The U.S. military must be prepared to conduct multiple, concurrent, 
contingency operations worldwide.  It must be able to do so in any 
environment, including one in which an adversary uses asymmetric means, 
such as nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons.  U.S. forces must be 
organized, trained, equipped and managed with multiple missions in mind. 
[Ref. 12: p. 1] 
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As Joint Vision 2010 points out loud and clear, the key to achieving this type of 
full spectrum dominance will be the ability of U.S. forces to acquire the information 
superiority that enable it.  All RMA visions, predictions and strategies are founded on the 
military’s need to rely heavily on technologies in order to make the forces lighter, more 
mobile and more lethal.  More specifically, this will require the military to be able to 
exploit the U.S.’s current leadership of computer, satellite and communication 
technology; and to support new concepts in acquisition, assimilation, integration, 
analysis, management, dissemination and communication of information from all sensors 
potentially of use in the battle space. [Ref. 15: p. 1] 
 
3. The Post Cold War Defense Era: A Revolution in Business Affairs  
In 1997, Defense Secretary Cohen announced the Defense Reform Initiative 
(DRI) to help pay for the Revolution in Military Affairs. [Ref. 12: p. 4].  The DRI was an 
effort to restructure the way DOD does business.  In order to do so, it called for DOD to 
embark on a Revolution in Business Affairs (RBA).  DRI’s call for such a revolution was 
founded on the belief that our defense establishment had operated under outdated and 
outmoded policies, procedures and infrastructure.  These attributes of the Defense 
establishment were designed to deal with a Cold War threat, and many of them are at 
least a decade out of date and far behind a private sector that restructured, revitalized, and 
is now competing strongly in a dynamic global marketplace.  [Ref. 12: p. 4]  
One key focus of the RBA is the recognized need to reduce cycle times in the 
development, procurement and updating of new and modified weapon systems.  Clearly, 
the success of the RMA relies heavily on DOD’s ability to maintain a technological 
advantage.  But any technological advantage we might have will be quickly lost unless 
DOD can stay ahead of the enemy.  Consequently, military leaders determined that there 
was a need to abandon traditional methods of acquiring advanced technology, traditional 
methods which during the Cold War era frequently resulted in 7 to 15 year cycle times.   
DOD’s acquisition community took the RBA “to heart” and went back to the 
drawing board with respect to the acquisition process.  Recognizing that the current 
acquisition process was designed to produce Cold War era systems, acquisition 
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executives embarked on a journey of reform and re-wrote the DOD 5000 series, which is 
the military’s principal acquisition document  [Ref. 16: p. 1].  The purpose of rewriting 
the 5000 series was to provide a process that encourages fielding to the users the best 
systems with available technology that are supportable, interoperable and affordable in 
less time and at less cost.  One objective of the new 5000 series was to achieve an 
average of five to seven year cycle time from program launch to production.   
The new 5000 series also calls for evolutionary acquisition principles and 
performance-based requirements as replacements for the slower Cold War acquisition 
methods.  Evolutionary acquisition methods rely more heavily on commercial 
technologies and products, particularly in subsystems and components.  As opposed to 
building weapon systems around not yet developed technology, military leaders are now 
forced to create evolutionary acquisition programs that will result not only in systems 
being deployed more quickly, but also allow for them to be updated as more advanced 
technology becomes available.  Consequently, the challenge facing acquisition executives 
now becomes accomplishing this in a marketplace dominated by civil-military industrial 
integration (rather than primarily military owned technology).  [Ref. 16: pp. 1-2] 
 
4. Changes in the Defense Technology and Industrial Base 
Just a decade ago, performance was the benchmark for developing new weapon 
systems; today it is performance at affordable cost, more specifically, at a cost that will 
allow DOD to obtain the quantities required.  Today, cost is a requirement that must be 
considered at every stage of the acquisition process, even while warfighters are focusing 
on enhancing weapon system performance.  [Ref. 12: p. 5]   
A decade of defense budget reductions forced an increasing emphasis on 
affordability as a leading investment factor.  Defense spending and the size of the 
Defense Technology Industrial Base actually began to decline a few years before the 
Cold War was over.  From its cold war peak, the defense budget was reduced by about 40 
percent in real terms.  Defense R&D outlays have declined at a similar rate, but 
procurement outlays dropped even more dramatically, from a 1990 high of $99 billion (in 
constant FY 96 dollars) to approximately $48 billion in 1996.  Or for another perspective, 
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procurement spending dropped from an equivalent of 2.4 percent of the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) in 1990 to 0.6 percent in 1996.  [Ref. 10: p. 15]   







Figure 1: U.S. Military Expenditure (in constant 1997 $), from 1985 -1999 [Ref. 17: p. 1] 
 
The overall defense budget can be viewed as a balance between funding for 
today’s forces (defined as readiness), funding to recruit, retain and equip the next force 
and funding to develop the technology for the force after the next (the latter two making 
up DOD’s short and long term “modernization” accounts).  Since the end of the Cold 
War, however, DOD has dealt with declining budgets by consciously slowing spending 
on force modernization and concentrating instead on maintaining current force readiness 
and quality of life issues.  By most accounts, DOD was highly successful in maintaining 
current military readiness in the face of deep budget reductions.  But the truth is that 
defense dollars do not go as far as they used to in the Cold War era.  
On the acquisition side, weapons costs continue to grow, both from 
generation to generation and from initial estimates to actuals.  The F-22 
fighter will cost at least twice as much per airplane as the F-15 that it replaces 
and 20 percent more than the Air Force currently admits.  On the support 
side, per-troop spending for operations and maintenance has grown in real 
terms by an average of more than three percent a year over the past 25 years.  
O&M now eats up more than 37 percent of DOD’s budget, compared with 28 
percent in the mid-1980’s.  [Ref. 18: p. 3]  
 
While the market for defense products has gotten smaller, the cost of the 
technology needed to maintain the kind of advantage central to the RMA’s success is 
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rising.  Today’s high tech weapons are becoming increasingly complex.  For example, in 
today’s combat aircraft nearly 50 percent of the final costs come from the avionics, 
sensors, fire control and weapon systems, components that a decade ago comprised 
barely 20 percent of the total costs.  Twenty years ago, metal bending was the most 
lucrative stage in defense manufacturing.  Today, the most lucrative and essential stage is 
the systems integration stage, which occurs when manufacturers integrate micro circuitry, 
sensors and high tech weapon systems into a complete platform.  These trends are 
pinching the defense industry from both sides: while defense spending has fallen, the 
costs associated with developing, producing and integrating new generations of high 
technology weapon systems are increasing.  [Ref. 8: pp. 14-15] 
DOD’s dramatic decrease in procurement spending over the last decade had 
equally dramatic effects on the Defense Technology and Industrial Base.  As mentioned 
previously, during the Cold War DOD often developed its own technology, or its own 
version of non-defense technology for use in military products.  Practically speaking, 
during the Cold War DOD funded and sustained a permanent defense industry that was 
set apart from the national industrial base.  When DOD slowed down total defense and 
procurement spending after the Cold War, private sector defense contractors reacted to 
the slow down by dismissing large numbers of civilian workers and expanding sales into 
civilian markets.  Those defense companies that did not adapt, chose either to exit the 
defense industry, go out of business or were bought out by larger companies.  In 1991, 
there were $300 million worth of defense industry mergers and that total has climbed to 
an annual rate averaging some $10 billion since 1994.  During this process of 
downsizing, more than two million jobs were eliminated in the defense sector.  [Ref. 8: p. 
2] 
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Defense budget reductions and infrastructure downsizing not only reduced the 
size of the Defense Technology and Industrial Base down to a small number of prime 
contractors, but also dramatically changed the character of the defense contractors as 
well.  The reorganization of the Defense Technology and Industrial Base in the 1990’s 
was more than a simple shedding of excess capacity and redundant workers.  The 
surviving defense companies have become integrated, broadly capable defense primes 
that have the resources and experience to compete across the spectrum of defense 
requirements and in the high-technology commercial marketplace.  [Ref. 8: pp. 16-18]  
Today, prime and subcontractors that do business for DOD have much more varied 
customer bases than in the past.   For one, a much larger portion of their current markets 
are devoted to commercial customers.  Secondly, many of their same products can now 
be sold without much, if any, alteration to both DOD and commercial customers  [Ref. 
10: p. 15].  Consequently, defense contractors have had to become more vertically 
integrated, much like their private industry counterparts.  In order to be more competitive 
and meet DOD’s simultaneous demands for performance and affordability, prime defense 
contractors have begun to rely more heavily on commercial suppliers and commercial 
practices.     
It’s not surprising given the spectacular changes that occurred amongst the 
individual defense contractors that the character of the entire Defense Technology and 
Industrial Base would change as well.  At the same time as the Cold War was reaching an 
end, a world-wide technology revolution was taking place, particularly in areas 
associated with information and communications systems.  As this occurred, the 
commercial industrial base (also known as the national industrial base) seized the 
opportunities created by these new technologies and began a process of technological and 
organizational innovation that far outstripped the ability of the Government to innovate.  
[Ref. 8: p. 16]   
The larger commercial divisions of the traditional defense industry contractors 
were also heavy participants in the commercial industrial base revolution/explosion  [Ref. 
10: p. 18].  Not surprisingly, today’s commercial sector now leads the innovation in many 
of the technical areas most critical to implementation of the military’s RMA visions and 
strategies.  Not only has the relationship between private industry and DOD changed, but 
also the distinction between a separate national industrial base and a Defense Technology 
Industrial Base has virtually gone away.  Increasingly, the nation is moving away from 
the idea of a unique Defense Technology and Industrial Base to a reliance on a broader 
national industrial base, some elements of which have unique competencies in defense-
related activities, but the majority of which are large companies with significant, even 
dominant commercially oriented activities.  [Ref. 8: p. 17]  
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 C. OTHER TRANSACTION AUTHORITY 
Although Other Transaction Authority (OTA) has been available to DOD and 
other Federal agencies for a number of years now, it continues to be a mystery to many 
Federal acquisition executives.  In order to adequately analyze DOD’s use of OTA with 
respect to its legislative intent, this researcher feels that it is important to review how the 
authority has evolved since its inception.  OTA is the term used to generally label all 
transactions based on Title 10 of United States Code, Section 2371 (10 U.S.C. 2371) 
authority.  However, 10 U.S.C 2371 authority covers many different areas.  Therefore, 
this section will also specifically define major OTA principles and concepts.  This section 
concludes with a discussion of DOD and other Federal Government Agencies’ use of 
OTA since it was developed. 
 
1. The Evolution of Other Transaction Authority 
Contracts, grants, cooperative agreements and Other Transactions are among the 
many tools DOD has to support or acquire research.  Title 10 U.S.C. 2371 is the 
legislation that specifically authorizes transactions other than contracts, grants, or 
cooperative agreements.  Each of the Title 10 instruments was developed for different 
reasons and is not interchangeable, but rather is to be used according to the nature of the 
research and the type of Government/recipient relationship desired.  Cooperative 
agreements, grants and OTs are classified as assistance instruments used by applicable 
Federal Agencies when the principal purpose is to stimulate or support R&D efforts for 
more public purposes. Contracts, on the other hand, are Federal Government procurement 
instruments, which means that they are used when the principal purpose of the project is 
the acquisition of goods and/or services.  Perhaps more important though, is the fact that 
Federal Government contracts are governed by the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 
and DOD procurement regulations.  In contrast, assistance instruments such as the ones 
authorized by 10 U.S.C. 2371 generally are not subject to the FAR or DOD procurement 
regulations, which gives Federal Agencies a considerable degree of flexibility in 
negotiating terms and conditions with the recipients.  [Ref. 19: p. 4] 
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The first Government agency to identify a need for an alternate contractual 
approach was the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA, formerly 
known as ARPA).  DARPA is a special DOD R&D organization, charged with the 
responsibility for managing and directing selected basic and applied DOD R&D projects 
and pursuing research and technology where risk and payoff are both very high and 
where success may provide dramatic advances for traditional military roles and missions. 
[Ref. 20]  As the private industry technology industries began to explode in the late 
1980’s, DARPA recognized that they had a need for tapping into this explosion and 
consequently, sought a contractual approach to negotiating terms and conditions that was 
more flexible than the standard FAR contract or cooperative agreement.  In direct 
response to DARPA’s need, Congress enacted 10 U.S.C. 2371 in 1989, which authorized 
the use of “Other Transactions” for basic, applied and advanced research projects.   
At the time, 10 U.S.C. 2371 was enacted as a temporary 2-year pilot program and 
its applicable authorities were given only to DARPA.  [Ref. 5: p. 2]  Additionally, the 
language codified in 10 U.S.C. 2371 did not specifically define “Other Transactions.”  
This gave DARPA the flexibility it desired to structure business relationships without 
being constrained by traditional Federal acquisition statutes and regulations.  As 
evidenced by the following quote taken from the legislation, Congress used such open-
ended language clearly with the intent to give DARPA authority to stimulate, support or 
acquire commercial research and technology.  [Ref. 2: p. 19]   
The Secretary of Defense, in carrying out advanced research projects through 
the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), may enter into cooperative 
agreements and other transactions with any person, any agency or 
instrumentality of the United States, any unit of State or local Government, 
any educational institution, and any other entity.  [Ref. 21] 
 
The FY 1992 Defense Authorization Act broadened 10 U.S.C. 2371 authority by 
including the Military Services and made it permanent.  However, this Act did add 
constraints on both DARPA and DOD’s use of the authority.  After 1992, in order to 
issue an OT, the issuing Government agency had to ensure that Government funding of 
the research did not exceed that provided by the non-Government parties to the maximum 
extent practical, and that the research did not duplicate research already being performed 
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within the Government.  The Act further stated that OTs should usually be issued to a 
consortium consisting of private companies, not-for-profit agencies, universities and 
Government organizations and may be used when a standard contract, grant, or 
cooperative agreement is not feasible or appropriate.  [Ref. 5: p. 2] 
The FY 1994 Defense Authorization Act, Section 845, once again changed OTA  
[Ref. 6: p. 5].  Section 845 expanded OTA by allowing DARPA to use OTs for prototype 
projects that were directly relevant to weapons or weapon systems.  Section 845 
authority, however, was given solely to DARPA and even then, only on a 3-year “trial” 
basis.  Interestingly enough, Section 845 did not provide specific objectives to be 
achieved from using OTA, nor did it define what constituted a prototype project.  
Furthermore, the Act did not require participants to share in the costs of the projects or 
require that the agreements be used when a standard contract, grant or cooperative 
agreement was not appropriate or feasible.  [Ref. 6: p. 5] 
A few years later, Section 804 of the FY 1997 Defense Authorization Act 
broadened Section 845 authority to include the Secretaries of the Military Departments 
and other officials designated by the Secretary of Defense and extended this authority out 
to September 30, 1999  [Ref. 5: p. 2].  Section 804 also stipulated that OTs being used for 
prototype projects (as opposed to basic, applied and advanced research projects) would 
not require cost sharing by the research participant(s), may be used even when a 
traditional contract would be feasible or appropriate and must be awarded using 
competitive procedures.  [Ref. 5: p. 2]  The General Accounting Office (GAO) noted the 
following:   
At the time Section 804 was enacted, senior DOD officials indicated that 
extending OTA to the Military Services and Defense Agencies would, among 
other things, assist their efforts to attract firms that traditionally did not 
perform research for the Government and reduce the time necessary to field 
new weapon systems.  [Ref. 6: p. 6] 
 
2. Other Transaction Authority as it Exists Today 
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At this stage in a review of the history of OTs, it becomes apparent that awards 
pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 2371 authority have evolved down two distinctly different paths; 
those OTs which are awarded for the purposes of pursuing prototype projects directly 
relevant to current or proposed weapons system and those OTs which are used to carry 
out basic, applied or advanced research projects.  It is important to further discuss these 
two different types of OTs.  The first type, OTs awarded for prototype projects 
(commonly referred to as Section 845 OTs), are authorized under the temporary National 
Defense Authorization Acts with sunset provisions found in the U.S. Code as a Note in 
10. U.S.C. 2371, Section 845 of Public Law 103-160.  It’s also important to point out that 
the Government categorizes this type of OT as an acquisition instrument.  DOD’s 
Director of Defense Procurement (DDP) has been given the responsibility for managing 
Section 845 OT policy for DOD.   
The second type, OTs used to carry out basic, applied or advanced research 
projects, is authorized under the permanent authority given by 10 U.S.C. 2371.  
Agreements reached under this authority are commonly referred to as Technology 
Investment Agreements (TIAs).  The Government treats research OTs as assistance 
instruments and assigned the Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) 
responsibility for managing 10 U.S.C. 2371 OT policy for DOD.  [Ref. 22]  The Defense 
Grant and Agreement Regulatory System (DGARS) governs awards made for assistance 
or other non-acquisition purposes using 10 U.S.C. 2371 authority, whereas, Section 845 
OTs are subject only to guidance issued by DDP and are not subject to DGARS. 
The most recent amendment to Section 845 OTA, Section 803 of the FY 2001 
Defense Authorization Act, extended DOD’s temporary Section 845 authority out to 
September 30, 2004 and established new conditions for the appropriate use of the 
authority.  [Ref. 4: Section C1]  Specifically, Section 803’s new conditions include the 
following [Ref. 22]: 
The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that no official of an agency enters into 
a transaction (other than a contract, grant or cooperative agreement) for a 
prototype project under the authority of this section unless… 
1. There is at least one non-traditional defense supplier participating to a 
significant extent in the prototype project; or 
2. No non-traditional defense supplier is participating to a significant extent 
in the prototype project, but at least one of the following circumstances 
exists: 
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(a) At least one third of the total cost of the prototype project is to be 
paid out of funds provided by parties to the transaction other than 
the Federal Government. 
(b) The senior procurement executive for the agency determines in 
writing that exceptional circumstances justify the use of a 
transaction that provides for innovative business arrangements or 
structures that would not be feasible or appropriate under a 
contract.   
 
Section 803 also included further additions to DOD’s previous statutory direction 
on the use of Section 845 authority.  For one, there is now language regarding 
Comptroller General audit responsibilities, which states that OTs for prototype projects 
that provide for total Government payments in excess of $5,000,000 must include a 
clause that provides for Comptroller General access to the agreement file.  Secondly, 
DOD must submit a report to Congress each year on the use of OTA and their 
compliance with Section 803’s tenets described above.  Section 803 also mirrored a few 
of the previous Section 845 OTA clauses.  For example, Section 803 states that to the 
maximum extent practicable, competitive procedures shall be used when entering into 
agreements for prototype projects and no transaction entered into under this authority 
shall provide for research that duplicates research being conducted under existing DOD 
programs.  [Ref. 4: Section C1.2]   
 
3. Relevant Other Transaction Authority Definitions 
As previously stated in Chapter I, this thesis will focus primarily on DOD’s use of 
Section 845 OTA.  As evidenced from the history of OTA legislation provided in the 
previous section, the concept has evolved significantly from its original form.  Having 
said that, this researcher feels that it is beneficial to take a step back for a moment and 
further clarify some terms and concepts that will be used throughout the remainder of this 
thesis.   
To begin with, OTA in general (meaning, regardless of whether the reference is to 
Section 845 prototype or 10 U.S.C. 2371 research OT authority) is best defined by what it 
is not.  The product of OTA, an Other Transaction, is not a contract, grant or cooperative 
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agreement.  Again, this means that OT agreements are not required to comply with 
traditional Government acquisition statutes, laws or regulations.  However, OT 
agreements are legally binding instruments between the Government and their 
recipient(s).   
Section 845 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1994 granted DOD 
the authority to use OTs in pursuit of prototype projects that are linked to weapons or 
weapon systems.  The statute, however, does not require that the prototype project be 
used specifically for the development of a weapon.  Rather, the statutory requirement 
states that the project should be “directly relevant to weapons or weapon systems 
proposed to be acquired or developed.”  [Ref. 22]  DOD describes a prototype as a 
physical or virtual model used to evaluate the technical or manufacturing feasibility or 
military utility of a particular technology or process, concept, end item, or system.  [Ref. 
4: Section C1.6]  While this may seem confusing, prototype projects can be better defined 
by identifying some of the things that are considered as part of a prototype project.   
For example, prototype projects pursued using Section 845 OTA can include sub-
systems, components, technology demonstrations and technologies of proposed DOD 
weapon systems.  Furthermore, the language is broad enough to also include training, 
simulation, auxiliary and support equipment that is “directly relevant to weapons or 
weapon systems.”  Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) quantities are not authorized to be 
acquired using Section 845 authority.  [Ref. 22] 
The original spirit behind Congress granting 10 U.S.C. 2371 OTA to DARPA in 
1989 was to give them the ability to tap into technology and R&D being accomplished by 
commercial industries, thus allowing DOD to pursue commercial solutions to defense 
requirements.  That spirit is still highly evident in today’s OTA statutory language.  In 
fact, this thesis will detail in later sections that one of the primary stated purposes of a 
Section 845 OT is to allow the Government to attract non-traditional suppliers who are at 
the “cutting edge” of technology.  Therefore, it’s important to define non-traditional 
suppliers.  According to DOD, a non-traditional supplier is: 
A business unit that has not, for a period of at least one year prior to the date 
of the OT agreement, entered into or performed on (1) any procurement 
contract that is subject to full coverage under the cost accounting standards 
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prescribed pursuant to Section 26 of the Office of Federal Procurement 
Policy Act (Title 41 U.S.C. 422) and the regulations implementing such 
section; or (2) any other procurement contract in excess of $500,000 to carry 
out prototype projects or to perform basic, applied or advanced research 
projects for a Federal agency.  [Ref. 4: Section DL1] 
 
4. Section 845  
To help meet the Post Cold War national security challenges previously 
described, DOD funds a vast array of R&D activities to exploit emerging technologies, 
develop advanced weapon systems and improve the capabilities of fielded weapon 
systems.  Over the past decade, Congress and DOD expressed concern that the 
Government acquisition system (which is implemented through specific contract 
provisions) inhibited DOD’s ability to take advantage of technological advances made by 
the private sector, which ultimately will increase the cost of goods and services that DOD 
acquires.  [Ref. 6: p. 3]   In an effort to address this concern, Congress passed in 1989 
Title 10 U.S.C. Section 2371, the piece of legislation that originally gave birth to OTA.   
As OTA evolved throughout the 1990’s, so to did its legislative intent.  OTA 
started out simply as a means for providing DARPA the flexibility to access commercial 
technology without any of the constraints typically imposed upon acquisition executives 
by the Government acquisition system.  In fact, at the time 10 U.S.C. 2371 authority was 
given to DARPA, the legislation specifically did not define “other transactions” so that it 
would give DARPA the flexibility to deal with unique situations encountered when 
fostering technology development, especially technology with both commercial and 
military applications.   [Ref. 6: p. 5]  Congress left the “defining” up to DARPA.   
Interestingly enough, the legislation that authorized Section 845 OTA in the 
National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1994 included the same kind of ambiguity 
with respect to its intent.  The legislation did not provide specific objectives to be 
achieved from using the authority, nor did it define what constituted a prototype project.  
Although this legislation did require DOD to report annually to Congress on its use of 
OTs, it did not define or require DOD to report on any specific performance metrics 
23 
related to use of OTA (not a surprise considering that no legislative objectives were 
given).  [Ref. 6: p. 5] 
Despite a lack of published legislative intent in the early years, DOD was quick to 
develop and point out what it thought Section 845 OTA’s intended purpose was.  In a 
1996 General Accounting Office (GAO) Report on DOD’s use of OT’s, DOD officials 
cited three primary reasons for using OTA: 
1. To help reduce the barriers to integrating the defense and civilian sectors of 
the industrial base. 
2. To promote new relationships and practices within the defense industry. 
3. To allow the Government to leverage for defense purposes the private 
sector’s financial investments in R&D of commercial products and 
processes.  [Ref. 19: p. 3] 
 
In addition to the three primary purposes above, DOD officials cited other reasons 
for using Section 845 OTA.  For one, there was a belief that OTs helped DOD to 
streamline acquisition practices or processes without having to apply for a waiver from 
statute/regulations.  Secondly, DOD organizations were finding that OTs were extremely 
helpful while negotiating intellectual property provisions with contractors.  Perhaps a 
good way to sum up all of the reasons why DOD used Section 845 OTA in the mid 
1990’s is to say that OTA was used to allow DOD to enter into business relationships that 
would otherwise be difficult or impossible to form using a contract.  [Ref. 23] 
The commercial technology explosion did not stop in the second half of the 
1990’s and DOD’s budgets continued to decline up through FY 1998.  As a direct 
response, DOD and Government officials continued their strong push for acquisition 
reform.  DOD’s temporary Section 845 OTA given under the FY 1994 Defense 
Authorization Act was twice extended (and is currently good through September 2004).  
Unlike the previous legislation, the most current extension to Section 845 OTA (enacted 
under Section 803 of the FY 2001 Defense Authorization Act) included amendments to 
the extension of the authority (each of the amendments was identified previously in 
Section 2).  Clearly, Section 803 shifted the intent of the legislation to a sole focus on 
using OTA to attract non-traditional suppliers to do business with DOD.  In a memo to 
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Secretaries of the Military Departments and Directors of Defense Agencies, then Under 
Secretary Gansler elaborated on this focus: 
It is DOD policy to establish policies and programs that improve, streamline 
and strengthen DOD component technology access and development 
programs, encourage open-market competition and technology-driven 
prototype efforts that offer increased military capabilities at lower total 
ownership costs and faster fielding times, and exploit the cost-reduction 
potential of accessing innovative or commercially developed technologies.  
OTA for prototype projects is a vital tool that will help the Department 
achieve these objectives.  [Ref. 24] 
 
DOD reinforced this new legislative intent by incorporating the amendment’s 
focus into its most recent “Other Transaction” Guide for Prototype Projects  [Ref. 4: 
Section C1].  According to the Guide, DOD’s primary reason for using Section 845 
OTA is to tap into R&D being accomplished by non-traditional defense suppliers.  More 
specifically, DOD would like to use OTA to attract non-traditional suppliers who are at 
the “cutting edge” of technology to the Government acquisition market and would like to 
do so without forcing these suppliers to change their existing business practices.  The 
idea behind this is that these non-traditional suppliers will help DOD in their plight to 
pursue commercial solutions to defense requirements  [Ref. 4: Section C1].  
 The Guide’s definition of non-traditional supplier is not limited to the prime 
contractor level either.  Rather, OTA should also be used to attract non-traditional 
suppliers at the level of prime, team members, subcontractors, and lower tier vendors or 
“intra-company” business units (provided the business unit makes a significant 
contribution to the prototype project).  Now that DOD’s primary reason to use the 
authority mirrors the major change in the legislation’s intent, it is required (as of FY 
2001) to track the involvement of non-traditional defense suppliers that participate to a 
significant extent in the prototype project as a metric and address it in its annual report to 
Congress.  [Ref. 4: Section C1.5] 
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5. Use of Other Transaction Authority 
DARPA, being the first agency to receive 10 U.S.C. 2371 OTA, leads the 
Government in the number of OT agreements awarded from FY 1990 to present.  As 
previously mentioned, only the permanent authority pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 2371 to award 
OTs for basic, applied or advanced research projects was available to DARPA prior to 
FY 1994 (legislation authorizing Section 845 OTA for prototype projects wasn’t 
developed yet).  Even though the early 10 U.S.C. 2371 legislation seemingly “left the 
door wide open” for DARPA to use OTs at will, they did not utilize them very much until 
the mid 1990’s.  The following graph of DARPA’s total number of OTs awarded and 
dollars obligated via OTs shows the progress in their use of 10 U.S.C. 2371 Research 
OTs over the years. 
  
Figure 2: Total number of 10 U.S.C. 2371 (Research) OTs awarded and dollars obligated 
by DARPA from 1990 – 2001 [Ref. 25] 
 
As the graph above indicates, DARPA’s usage of OTs did not pick up until 1993, 
which consequently was about the time the legislation for the FY 1994 Defense 
Authorization Act giving them the authority to use Section 845 OTs for prototype 
projects was being drafted.  DARPA’s early usage of Section 845 OTs followed a similar 
pattern to their usage of 10 U.S.C. 2371 Research OTs (e.g., they awarded a greater 
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number and for a larger dollar amount each subsequent year).  DARPA’s first use of 
Section 845 OTA was for the High Altitude Endurance Unmanned Ariel Vehicle (HAE 
UAV), which at the time was an Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) 
Project.  Other notable projects that DARPA used Section 845 OTs for were the Arsenal 
Ship program and the Affordable Mutli-Missile Manufacturing program.  [Ref. 26: 
Section V-B] The following graph depicts DARPA’s total number of Section 845 OTs 
awarded and dollars obligated using them. 
 
Figure 3: Total number of Section 845 OTs awarded and dollars obligated by DARPA 
from 1994 – 2001 [Ref. 25] 
 
The Services began to use 10 U.S.C. 2371 authority to award OTs in 1994, which 
is when DDR&E issued interim guidance for Military Departments and DARPA on the 
use of grants, cooperative agreements and “other transactions.”  However, for the first 
couple of years, the Services chose to award more cooperative agreements than OTs as 
the legislation’s language at the time stated that OTs could only be used when a standard 
contract, grant or cooperative agreement was not feasible.  [Ref. 26: Section V-A]   
As of FY 2000, DOD awarded 245 Section 845 OT agreements that varied in type 
and dollar value.  Almost immediately after the Services were given Section 845 OTA in 
1997, their use of prototype OTs surpassed DARPA’s usage.  In just the first two years of 
having the authority (1997 & 1998), the Services awarded 57 Prototype OTs, which 
accounted for nearly two-thirds of the total agreements awarded by DOD.  The Services’ 
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initially high use of Prototype OTs was largely due to the Commercial Operations and 
Support Savings Initiative (COSSI), a DOD initiative intended to reduce maintenance 
costs of fielded weapon systems by using commercial products and processes.  DOD 
made the use of Section 845 OTs a requirement for this initiative.  Additionally, the 
Services’ use of Section 845 OTs skyrocketed in FY 1999 as DOD encouraged its use in 
the pursuit of dual-use technology projects.  [Ref. 6: p. 6]  The following table presents a 
breakdown by individual DOD component of their use of Section 845 Prototype OTs in 
the early years. 
   
                                                             
Component 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Army    10 3 13 
Air Force    8 5 13 
Navy    20 11 31 
DARPA 1 6 8 4 15 34 
Total 1 6 8 42 34 91 
 
Table 1:  DOD’s Use of Section 845 Agreements from FY 1994 – FY 1998 [Ref. 6: p. 6]  
 
DOD has used Section 845 OTA over the years to support a wide range of 
projects.  For example, more than half of the projects that Section 845 OTs were used for 
involved either (1) studies to evaluate the feasibility or merits of future weapon systems 
concepts/technologies or (2) the design and development of hardware-related subsystems 
and components.    Section 845 OTs have also been used to support the development of 
software, information systems and various imaging and detection technologies.  
Interestingly enough, a few prototype projects that used OTs will result in the 
development and manufacture of a major end item (for example, a new oceanographic 
research ship for the Navy).   [Ref. 6: p. 7] 
While it is true that DOD has increased its number of Section 845 OTs awarded 
over the last few years, the total dollar value of its obligations as compared to total DOD 
dollars obligated to R&D activities using traditional contracts remains very small.  As of 
October 1998, DOD’s total financial commitment using Section 845 OTs (from FY 1994 
– FY 1998) totaled $2.6 billion, a very small amount compared to the $100 billion spent 
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by DOD on R&D using traditional contracts during the same period.  Interestingly 
enough, of the $2.6 billion obligated using OTs, $2.1 billion (over 80 percent) was 
concentrated in just 10 out of a total of 97 agreements.  [Ref. 6: p. 4]   
Recent data does, however, indicate that DOD’s use of Section 845 OTs (both in 
number of agreements made and dollar value of awards) over the last two fiscal years has 
risen sharply. The following graphs present both the number of new Section 845 OTs 









FY94 FY95 FY96 FY97 FY98 FY99 FY00












FY94 FY95 FY96 FY97 FY98 FY99 FY00




DOD has spent much of the last decade scrambling to adapt to the “new world 
order.”  The economic prosperity of the 1990’s and the absence of a super power 
challenger have completely changed the security environment for DOD.  During the old 
Cold War era, the world was burdened by the constant threat of nuclear annihilation.  Our 
adversaries and their capabilities were well known to us.  The U.S. military owned and 
drove the advancement of “cutting edge” technology and Defense budgets were 
enormous.   
Today DOD is operating in an environment characterized by unknown yet highly 
lethal adversaries, lightening fast commercial technological advancement cycles and 
reduced defense budgets as compared to the Cold War period.  Private industry has 
enjoyed a decade of success as a result of its incredible ability to adapt, transform and 
remain competitive in the  “new world order.”  DOD is attempting to do exactly the same 
thing as it embarked on a Revolution in Military Affairs.  Presently, not even the highest 
Government and Military officials can say with complete confidence what the military 
force necessary to accomplish our future national security strategies will look like.  They 
can say, however, that superior technology will be the foundation of that future military 
force.  This belief is clearly demonstrated in the following quote from DOD’s FY 2000 
Science and Technology Strategy:   
In peace, technological superiority is a key element of deterrence.  In crisis, it 
provides a wide spectrum of options to the national command authorities and 
commanders in chief, while providing confidence to our allies.  In war, it 
provides an edge that enhances combat effectiveness, reduces casualties and 
minimizes equipment loss.  In view of declining defense budgets and 
manpower reductions, advancing affordable military technology and ensuring 
that it undergoes rapid transition to the warfighter are critical national 
security obligations.  [Ref. 27: p. 14] 
 
Congress and Government acquisition executives developed OTA legislation in 
order to assist DOD in its efforts to leverage the commercial technological explosions 
occurring in private industry.  By offering an alternative to traditional FAR-type 
contracts, DOD officials are attempting to attract the most technologically advanced non-
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traditional suppliers to the DOD acquisition market with the hope of using these new 
relationships to field more capable weapon systems faster and with lower total ownership 
costs. 
The next chapter will explore in more detail specific issues surrounding DOD’s 
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III. ATTRACTING NON-TRADITIONAL SUPPLIERS TO THE 
FEDERAL ACQUISITION MARKET 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The underlying premise of DOD’s visions and warfighting strategies is the belief 
that their ability to maintain technological superiority on the battlefield will directly 
depend on the acquisition community’s ability to obtain and leverage the most advanced 
technologies available in the world  [Ref. 7: p. 6].  In the past, this wasn’t a problem.  
U.S. Government R&D used to be the major force driving technological innovation in the 
world and DOD procurement typically created a pull for private sector R&D.  This is not 
the case today.  [Ref. 15] 
Commercial developments in many areas such as advanced computing, 
electronics, communications and medical research have far outpaced DOD’s 
developments and are driven by business market forces rather than military need.   [Ref. 
10: p. 16]  Declining budgets and dramatic changes in the characterization and makeup of 
the Defense Technology Industrial Base have forced DOD to rely more heavily on 
commercial industry during weapon systems development.  Yet, many of the commercial 
industry businesses that hold the world’s most advanced technology do not currently do 
business with the Federal Government.  DOD’s Director of Defense Procurement, Deidre 
Lee, recently commented: 
Many firms that are the leaders in developing cutting edge technologies are 
currently unwilling to do business with DOD.  DOD needs the best 
technological solutions and is adversely affected when these firms will not do 
business with DOD. [Ref. 28] 
 
Technology and Procurement Policy Subcommittee Chairman Tom Davis noted 
that the Government’s share of U.S. R&D spending dwindled from two-thirds to one-
third from 1960 to 1999.   
At the same that Government is no longer driving technological innovation, 
many commercial firms that invest billions of dollars in R&D every year are 
refusing to do business with the Government.  This has serious implications 
for the well being of the United States.  The real loss from the non-
33 
participation from leading commercial R&D firms in the Government 
programs is the loss of alternatives, the loss of ideas and the loss of 
competitive solutions.  [Ref. 29] 
 
The focus of DOD’s current regulations and policies regarding Section 845 OTA 
is aimed specifically at addressing this problem, attracting non-traditional companies to 
the DOD acquisition market  [Ref. 4: Section C1].  In fact, the most current OT for 
Prototype Project legislation, Section 803, explicitly states that the first criterion DOD 
must meet before using Section 845 OTA is that there has to be at least one non-
traditional supplier participating to a significant extent in the prototype project.  [Ref. 4, 
Introduction]  DOD believes that by using this special acquisition authority, they will be 
able to attract to the Federal acquisition market high-tech commercial R&D firms who 
were previously unwilling to conduct business with the Government (e.g., non-traditional 
suppliers).  Simply put, DOD believes that Section 845 OTA will allow them to tap into 
the R&D being accomplished by non-traditional companies and thus, pursue commercial 
solutions to defense requirements  [Ref. 4: Section C1].   
This chapter will examine the issues surrounding DOD’s efforts to attract non-
traditional companies to do business with them.  This chapter begins with a look at 
common barriers that prevent commercial companies from pursuing business in 
Government acquisition markets.  Secondly, the researcher will highlight trends in DOD 
and commercial industry R&D and technology, which consequently provide the 
background for a discussion regarding the importance of DOD’s ability to gain greater 
access to commercial industry’s R&D and technology efforts.  In closing, this chapter 
will present various elements of Section 845 OT arrangements. 
 
B. BARRIERS TO ATTRACTING NON-TRADITIONAL COMPANIES   
Clearly, DOD finds itself in a unique business situation today.  The age-old 
pattern of defense technology “spinning off” into the commercial sector has been 
replaced with a pattern of commercial technology “spinning on” to military applications.  
Additionally, DOD expenditures on technology and R&D represent a much smaller 
percentage of total U.S expenditures in this category  [Ref. 7: p. 6].  As a consequence, 
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many times DOD finds itself having to buy from companies that either do not want or 
need to do business with them.  Research has been devoted in the past to the study of why 
companies are not willing to conduct business with DOD  [Ref. 30: p. 1].  Many of these 
studies have concluded that it is the Government’s buying practices that form major 
barriers to non-traditional companies doing business in the defense market.  But, what 
exactly are those barriers and what is it about them that keep companies from wanting to 
conduct business with DOD?     
DOD’s concern that there might exist a significant number of commercial 
companies unwilling to participate in the Defense acquisition market is actually not just a 
Post Cold War concern.  Even prior to the end of the Cold War, research was being 
conducted within DOD to determine both if this was the case or not, and if so, what were 
the reasons  [Ref. 31].  It’s interesting to note that even in the mid to late 1980’s, well 
before the push for Government acquisition reform, DOD recognized the importance of 
cultivating business with commercial companies other than the traditional large defense 
prime contractors.  Additionally, DOD acquisition officials were becoming increasingly 
more aware of the fact that the procurement system’s complexity, red tape, bureaucratic 
inaction and tendency to encourage micromanagement of contractor’s actions might be 
driving companies away from doing business with them, regardless of the amount of 
money DOD was spending in the private sector.  [Ref. 31] 
 
1. Barriers - Pre Cold War 
A 1987 study conducted by Dr. David Lamm of the Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey, CA, surveyed over 1,300 commercial firms from selected industries in an 
attempt to determine the nature and extent of company refusal to participate in DOD 
business.  [Ref. 31: p. 45]  Survey responses showed that burdensome paperwork and 
Government bidding methods were the two major reasons why companies refused 
defense business.  In fact, close to 70 percent of the respondents to his survey listed 
burdensome paperwork as one of their primary complaints related to dealing with the 
Government.  One company in particular stated in their survey response that one of their 
proposals to a Government solicitation took three weeks to prepare and included 100 
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pages of paperwork, whereas a proposal to a similar commercial job took only three 
hours to prepare and 10 pages of paperwork.  [Ref. 31:  pp.  48-49] With respect to 
Government bidding methods, “most focused on the extensive bid package involving 
unreadable specifications, unrealistic standards and unobtainable standards.”  [Ref. 31:  p. 
50]  Many of the complaints that survey respondents had regarding burdensome 
paperwork and bidding methods pertained to problems that they encountered prior to 
contract award.  [Ref. 31: p. 50] 
Dr. Lamm’s study also identified several other reasons why companies refused 
defense business.  In addition to the two most popular responses cited above, inflexible 
procurement polices and more attractive commercial ventures were identified as being 
the third and fourth most popular reasons.  [Ref. 31: p. 54]  Of the 427 respondents in the 
survey, slightly more than 20 percent stated that they would not seek DOD business in 
the future and an additional 30 percent were dissatisfied enough with the market that they 
voiced their complaints in the survey, even though they were not planning on refusing to 
do future business with DOD. [Ref. 31: p. 53]  This fact alone leads to a very important 
point regarding the circumstances that might cause a firm to refuse defense business.   
Companies refusing DOD business have essentially no difference in their 
reasons than companies that are in defense business but are dissatisfied with 
the system.  The implication is that a fine line separates the “out” companies 
from the “in” companies, and that the latter may join the former with just a 
little more dissatisfaction.  [Ref. 31:  p. 54] 
 
2. Barriers - Post Cold War 
Many dramatic changes have occurred in the acquisition environment since Dr. 
Lamm’s 1987 study.  A major re-structuring of the Defense Technology and Industrial 
Base, several acquisition reform initiatives and post Cold War reductions in defense 
spending have no doubt affected private industry’s attitude towards doing business with 
the Government.  The question now becomes, are companies still refusing defense 
business now as they were in 1987?  And if so, is it for the same reasons identified in Dr. 
Lamm’s study? 
In an attempt to answer these questions, Susan Randall, a Master’s student at the 
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, conducted a follow-on study in 1997 in the 
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same subject area.  [Ref. 30]  The purpose of her study was to identify in the more current 
acquisition environment, the extent to which companies refuse defense business and the 
reasons why they are refusing.  Using a very similar methodology to Dr. Lamm’s, Susan 
Randall surveyed 1300 companies sprinkled across various industries.  [Ref. 30: p. v]   
   One of the major tenets of Government acquisition reform in the mid 1990’s 
was the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA).  FASA is generally credited as 
being the landmark acquisition reform legislation of this period and was designed to 
transform the Government procurement process into a simplified, more efficient and 
accessible system.  [Ref. 30:  p. 16]  The need for this transformation is obvious, 
considering the results of Dr. Lamm’s Study. 
Prior to FASA’s passage many commercial companies were reluctant to do 
business with the Federal Government because of the costs and risk 
associated with the myriad of cost accounting rules, socioeconomic statutes, 
and Government-peculiar inspection systems that applied only to 
Government contracts.  [Ref. 30: p. 19]       
FASA and similar acquisition reform initiatives of the time were developed specifically 
to address these concerns.  For example, FASA exempted the Government’s procurement 
of commercial items from many of the burdensome reporting and record keeping 
requirements associated with non-commercial contracts. Secondly, FASA exempted 
DOD from requiring cost or pricing data during the negotiation of commercial item 
procurements.  [Ref. 30: pp. 19-20]  
Intuitively, one would expect that acquisition reform efforts such as FASA would 
have resulted in a much smaller number of companies refusing to do business with the 
Government today (as compared to the 1980’s).  However, Susan Randall’s study 
indicates that this is not true.  [Ref. 30]  First of all, her study concluded that there was a 
significantly greater proportion of companies refusing to participate in DOD business in 
1997 as compared to 1987.  The statistics in her research revealed that 42 percent of her 
respondents were either currently conducting business with DOD and intending to get out 
of the business or were not in business with DOD and had no intention of entering the 
market.  This statistic is double the amount reported in the 1987 study.  [Ref. 30: p. 133]   
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Additionally, the Randall study concluded that the principal reasons why 
companies refuse to conduct business with DOD in 1997 had not significantly changed 
from the reasons identified in the 1987 study.  [Ref. 30: p. 135]  More specifically, this 
study concluded that burdensome paperwork, Government bidding methods, inflexible 
procurement policies, low profitability and more attractive commercial ventures topped 
the respondents’ list as the top five reasons why they refused DOD business.  [Ref. 30:  p. 
135] 
Although, the Government has initiated several improvements to the Federal 
procurement system over the last ten years (primarily through FASA, FARA 
and ITMRA), the researcher concludes that these changes have not 
significantly impacted companies’ attitudes towards Defense business.  [Ref. 
30: p. 136]  
 
Randall’s 1997 study also solicited comments from the survey respondents aimed 
at determining if there were specific improvements that could be made that would 
encourage those who were currently refusing to do business to change their mind.  [Ref. 
30: p. 137]  Accordingly, the companies stated that if the following improvements were 
made to the DOD acquisition system, they would enter the market: 
• Reduce the use of military specifications. 
• Eliminate non-relevant paperwork in bidding requirements. 
• Ensure timely payments to the contractor. 
• Reduce the amount of paperwork in the overall procurement 
process.  [Ref. 30: p. 137] 
 
3. Barriers in the Defense Research and Development Market 
As previously mentioned, OTA was developed with the intent of providing DOD 
the flexibility to negotiate business relationship terms and agreements without the 
restrictions imposed by traditional FAR clauses.  DOD officials and legislators 
envisioned Section 845 OTA being used to allow firms to conduct business with the 
Government without changing any of their current practices or processes.  It is commonly 
understood that companies organize to do business in either the defense sector or the 
commercial sector, but rarely do both under one administrative roof.  [Ref. 7: p. 34]  
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“Companies that do business in both sectors typically have separate divisions that are 
organized differently and almost never share staff, production and research facilities, 
data, and accounting procedures.”  [Ref. 7: p. 34]  Commercial divisions respond to 
market conditions, whereas the Defense divisions typically respond to military programs 
and budget cycles.  Maintaining such dramatically separate operations is extremely costly 
and is only done when it makes good business sense.  [Ref. 7:  p. 34] 
Traditional DOD contracts usually regulate profit in some respect, even when it’s 
a cost-type contract involving heavy R&D.  In contrast, most high-technology private 
industry companies recover their investment in R&D through large profits, then reinvest 
those profits in the next generation product.  [Ref. 7: p. 34]  Traditional defense 
contractors, on the other hand, are able to survive on smaller profits because their R&D 
costs are typically recovered through terms of the contract.  However, in these cases the 
Government usually owns the data rights so that they can make the data package 
available to future bidders in an effort to promote future competition.  Commercial 
companies that invest heavily in R&D do not subscribe to this process because they see it 
as offering their trade secrets to their competition.  [Ref. 7: p. 34] 
As it stands, the intellectual property rights clauses found in traditional FAR type 
contracts are the Government regulation that companies most frequently cite as their 
reason for refusing Government R&D contracts.  [Ref. 32: p. 18]   
Many technology businesses are reluctant to conduct research and 
development with the Government because of uncertainties about who would 
receive the intellectual property that results from the ventures.  [Ref. 29] 
 
The Government’s rights to hold patents and intellectual property (IP) represent the major 
barrier preventing commercial companies from performing R&D for the Government.  
Many of the world’s leading high technology companies bypass DOD business because 
traditional DOD contracts prohibit them from using their innovations in future 
commercial products.  [Ref. 28] 
The concept of IP is a fundamental concept in the world’s free market societies.  
“A company’s interest in protecting its IP from uncompensated exploitation is as 
important as a farmer’s interest in protecting his or her seed corn.”  [Ref. 33: p. iii]  In the 
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DOD acquisition arena, IP typically refers to patents, copyrights, trademarks and trade 
secrets.  [Ref. 33: p. 1]  The Bayh-Dole Act is the guiding regulation regarding IP in 
Government contracts and was originally designed to facilitate the commercialization and 
public availability of inventions.  [Ref. 6: p. 30]  While it is DOD’s policy (when using 
traditional FAR type contracts) to acquire only the IP necessary to satisfy DOD needs, its 
decision with respect to how to handle IP rights really comes down to who is funding the 
R&D.  For example, DOD usually obtains unlimited rights when IP was developed 
exclusively with DOD funds, Government purpose rights when the IP was created with 
mixed funding, and limited rights when the IP was developed exclusively at the private 
firm’s own expense.  [Ref. 6:  p. 30] 
One of the guiding principles behind Section 845 OTA is the Government’s desire 
to implement best commercial business practices.  As such, the standard IP requirements 
normally imposed by the Bayh-Dole Act do not apply to OT agreements, meaning that 
Agreement Officers are free to negotiate IP terms and conditions different from those 
found in FAR type contracts.  [Ref. 4: Section C2.3]  IP issues tend to be very complex.  
Therefore, there is no single answer that can be applied to every situation regarding the 
question of what’s the most appropriate IP strategy.   
In the final analysis, flexibility will be the hallmark of future 
Government/industry R&D agreements.  It is in the Government’s best 
interest to understand, and when possible and appropriate, accommodate 
industry’s concerns in protecting its IP.  Only in this way will the 
Government be able to tap into the billions of dollars worth of R&D and 
cutting edge technologies available in commercial companies that cannot or 
will not do business with the Government under the current regulatory 
circumstances.  [Ref. 22] 
 
C. TECHNOLOGY ISSUES 
Huge defense spending cuts in the United States from FY 1986 up until FY 1998 
have directly lead to the re-structuring of the Defense Technology and Industrial Base 
(DTIB) and the nation’s industrial base.  However, it’s not simply the change in size or 
configuration of these bases that drives DOD’s need to attract to the defense market non-
traditional commercial firms that currently only support the national industrial base.  
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Rather, it is the drastic changes over the last decade in the amount of R&D spending in 
each base.  
1. Federal Research and Development 
In order to properly discuss trends in Federal R&D, it’s important to first 
understand the different categories of Federal R&D spending.  At the Federal 
Government level, total Federal R&D can be broken down into two categories: defense 
and non-defense.  [Ref. 35]  The real reason behind such a simplistic breakdown is that 
defense R&D spending comprises such a large percentage of total Federal R&D spending 
that most other agencies’ individual spending seems inconsequential in comparison.  In 
FY 1999, defense R&D comprised 48 percent of total Federal R&D.  [Ref. 34]   
Defense R&D spending is mostly captured within DOD’s Research, 
Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) program, which is one of the major 
elements of DOD’s total budget.  [Ref. 36: p. 1]  The RDT&E budget is then sub-divided 
into seven separate categories (designated as Program Elements 6.1 through 6.7): basic 
research (6.1), applied research (6.2), advanced technology development (6.3), 
demonstration and validation (6.4), engineering manufacturing development (6.5), 
management support (6.6), and operational systems development (6.7).  [Ref. 36: p. 1]  
“Funding for the first two categories (6.1 and 6.2) constitute what is called DOD’s 
Technology Base program and is often referred to as the ‘seed corn’.”  [Ref. 36: p. 2]  
The Technology Base combined with 6.3 activities make up DOD’s Science and 
Technology Program (S&T).  However, the remaining categories (6.4 through 6.7) are 
where the largest percentage of the RDT&E budget goes.  [Ref. 36: p. 3] 
FY 2001 marks an all time high (in inflation adjusted terms) in total Federal R&D 
spending over the last quarter century.  [Ref. 35: p. 1]  In 1976, the Government spent 
less than $60 billion (in today’s adjusted dollars) as compared to the $85 billion budgeted 
for FY 2001.  While one may guess that there was a smooth upward linear path between 
these two points, that is far from the case.  The relative split between defense and non-
defense R&D spending has also changed over the years.  The following graph depicts the 
changes in total Federal R&D spending and the split between defense and non-defense 
categories over the last 25 years: 
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Figure 6: Trends in Federal R&D Spending (in billions of constant FY 2000 dollars), 
from FY 1976-2001  [Ref. 35] 
 
As evidenced from the graph above, defense specific R&D spending (a part of 
total DOD RTD&E program spending) has changed over the years.  An obvious anomaly 
in the spending trend is the peak that occurred in the mid 1980’s.  From FY 1980 to its 
peak in FY 87, defense R&D nearly doubled in real terms as the U.S. embarked upon a 
substantial increase in all forms of defense spending.  By FY 87, defense R&D was two-
thirds of total Federal R&D spending.  [Ref. 35: p. 2]   
Even though total real defense R&D spending increased since the mid 70’s, real 
RDT&E funding from FY 1988 through FY 1998 remained relatively level.  During this 
same period (FY 88 – FY 98), DOD spent an average of $36 billion a year on RDT&E, of 
which over 80 percent has gone to the development of specific military systems 
(activities 6.4 through 6.7).  The remaining 20 percent funded the Technology Base 
programs.  [Ref.  36: Summary] If inflation is taken into consideration, DOD’s RDT&E 
spending declined from a FY 1987 peak every year until FY 1998.  Interestingly, much of 
the decline is attributed primarily to the activities associated with developing specific 
weapon systems.  More specifically, much of the decline took place in funding for 6.4, 
6.5 and 6.7 activities, which are activities that support a formal acquisition program.  
[Ref. 36: p. 3]  In contrast, the Technology Base program (a.k.a. DOD’s “seed corn”) has 
for the most part kept up with inflation.  [Ref. 36: Summary]  In the final analysis, FY 
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2001 total defense R&D spending in real terms is one-third below the peak funding levels 
of the late 1980’s.  [Ref. 35: p. 2] 
Given the fact that real defense R&D spending had steadily declined from FY 
1988 – FY 1998, it’s not difficult to imagine that the same trend has occurred for defense 
R&D spending within the few remaining defense companies.  Traditionally, there are 
three sources of R&D funds for defense industry companies: 1) DOD contract R&D for 
development programs; 2) Company-sponsored R&D; and 3) Independent Research and 
Development (IRAD) paid for by the Government but spent at the discretion of the 
contractor.  [Ref. 37: p. 8]  According to Booz–Allen & Hamilton’s 2000 study on the 
U.S. Defense Industry, the first two categories have declined steadily from FY 1988 
through FY 1998.  The third category, IRAD, has increased, but because it has been used 
more for the development of specific deliverables, rather than long term independent 
R&D.  [Ref. 37: p. 9] 
2. Industry Research and Development 
Times have changed significantly since 1976, when a professional science 
organization christened the first edition of their association magazine with the following 
opening line: “The Federal Government holds most of the high cards which determine the 
thrust and priorities of scientific research and development effort in the United States.”  
[Ref. 35: pp. 6-7]  Since then, a dramatic shift in the composition of total national R&D 
spending has occurred.  In 1980, private industry first exceeded Federal Government 
spending on R&D.  Ever since then (with the exception of DOD’s peak spending level in 
1987), Federal R&D spending has lagged in comparison with private industry’s efforts.  
In 1999, private industry accounted for 68.5 percent of total U.S. R&D and the Federal 
share has continued to decline.  [Ref. 35: p. 6]  Table 2 highlights the growth of 
industry’s share of total national R&D spending over the last several decades. 
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Table 2: National Funds for R&D by Source of Funds (in millions)  [Ref. 35: p. 6] 
 
Given that the technological explosions occurring in private industry are driving 
the “new global economy,” many experts believe that the current trends discussed above 
will continue well into the next century. 
The near-term economic competitiveness of U.S. firms, progress on today’s 
technological frontiers, and the overall health of the increasingly technology-
based U.S. economy are today far more dependent on U.S. industrial firms’ 
R&D efforts than could have been imagined 25 years ago, and the overall 
health of the U.S. R&D enterprise is far more dependent on private industry.  
[Ref. 35: p. 7] 
 
3. The Need for Accessing Non-Traditional Research and Development 
The United States’ national security rests in large part on the ability of the Armed 
Forces to maintain world wide technological superiority.  This was true in the past, and 
regardless of the specific strategy being followed, will remain the case in the future.  In 
this post Cold War era, “the Department of Defense and a wide array of scholars, 
analysts, and visionaries outside the military assert that the U.S. military is on the 
threshold of a Revolution in Military Affairs.”  [Ref. 18: p.1]   DOD’s RMA vision for 
the 21st century consists of a force made up of warfighters that are fast, lean, mobile and 
prepared for battle with total battlespace situational awareness and information assurance.  
[Ref. 38: p. 2]   
Much of the discussions surrounding DOD’s new visions and strategies center on 
the exploitation of superior technology.  [Ref. 18: p. 1]  In order to successfully carry out 
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these new visions and strategies, DOD must ensure that they have access to and benefit 
fully from the most cutting edge technologies.  In times past, DOD developed their own 
cutting edge technology for use in military products.  But also in times past, DOD had the 
money to finance this development and used a robust defense unique industrial base to 
carry it out.  This is not possible today.    [Ref. 9] 
 Defense budget reductions have forced an increasing emphasis on affordability as 
a leading investment factor in DOD’s R&D programs.  [Ref. 15: p. 7]  The simple fact is 
that DOD will not be able to afford the weapon systems they need to successfully carry 
out the RMA’s visions and strategies unless their cost of development is significantly 
reduced.  Since the end of the Cold War, DOD has dealt with declining budgets by 
concentrating on force readiness rather than modernization.  It’s apparent though, that the 
success of the RMA is almost totally dependent on DOD’s ability to modernize their 
force.  [Ref. 15: p. 7]   
Modernizing the Armed Forces no doubt requires significant R&D efforts.  
However, budget pressures have also squeezed military R&D spending.  Data presented 
earlier show that military R&D spending is currently down 30 percent from its inflation-
adjusted peak in the late 1980’s.  [Ref. 33: Foreword]  To make matters even tougher, 
DOD’s revised acquisition process spells out specific goals such as dramatically reducing 
weapon system total ownership costs and rapidly deploying advanced technology 
products to the warfighters.  In order to achieve the much needed force modernization 
and accomplish the acquisition system’s new goals within a reduced budget environment, 
DOD will need access to technology that is both timely and affordable.  [Ref. 15: p. 7] 
In addition to the affordability problem, accessing the technology that DOD needs 
for future survival is not as simple as acquiring it more quickly from in house labs or 
providing better incentives for defense contractors to come up with it.  At the same time 
that defense R&D spending was declining, private industry spending on R&D soared, so 
much so that it accounts for two-thirds of the nation’s total R&D spending.  [Ref. 33: p. 
iii]   
DOD historically pursued competition to assure efficiency, affordability and 
innovation in the DTIB.  Over the last several years, however, the DTIB has undergone a 
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fundamental change. The DTIB transition brought about by the end of the Cold War and 
complicated by the explosion of the “new economy” means that traditional defense 
companies are now competing for resources (human, financial and technological) with 
the “new economy” companies.  [Ref. 39]  The end result is that a number of leading 
technology companies have exited the defense market and the companies remaining are 
competing for fewer new major programs.  The irony about this is that the technologies 
so critical to achieving future advances in military capability are being increasingly 
developed in the private sector.  The truth is that “today’s commercial world is leading 
the process of innovation and efficiency in many areas critical to defense in the next 
century.”  [Ref. 10: p. 24]   
Many believe that the hard reality facing DOD is that the two previous industrial 
bases (DTIB and national industrial base) have already merged, yet DOD’s business 
practices have not kept pace with this fundamental shift.  [Ref. 40: p. 6]  Despite 
significant efforts over the last decade on the part of Government and DOD officials to 
reform the acquisition system, there still remains a strong belief that there are significant 
barriers to preventing commercial companies from doing business with DOD.  [Ref. 10: 
p. 24]  The bottom line is that in the future, DOD may have to buy advanced technology 
from commercial companies that do not need or even want its business. 
Given the situation described above, it is clear that DOD must find new ways to 
solve its problems.  Declining budgets and R&D spending limit DOD’s ability to sustain 
a cutting edge DTIB (with the exception of a few military specific areas).  Additionally, 
many technologies critical to future warfighting are being developed and fielded from 
commercial companies operating in non-defense markets.  Better, faster, cheaper are the 
latest mantras of DOD acquisition.  There is no way DOD will be able to solve its 
problems without tapping into the superior technology available in the commercial world.  
Therefore, it is extremely critical that DOD have access to the R&D resources and 
creative forces of the U.S. industrial base, or more specifically, to the host of leading 
edge companies that have never done business with them in the past.  
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4. Elements of Other Transaction Agreements 
OTs are most easily defined by describing what they are not.  OTs are not a 
contract, grant or cooperative agreement.  Consequently, they are much simpler and 
shorter than a traditional procurement contract. Of course, the intended point of this 
legislative freedom is that it enables Agreement Officers to design the best agreement for 
the situation.   Essentially what this means is that Agreement Officers start with a blank 
sheet of paper when they craft an OT.  But, this also means that there is no one format for 
such agreements.  [Ref. 32: p. 25]  Given this, one might ask if there are any common 
elements of OT arrangements and if so, how might they encourage non-traditional 
companies to pursue defense business?      
The Director of Defense Procurement (DDP) has cognizance for overseeing 
DOD’s implementation of Section 845 OTs.  [Ref. 32: p. 28]  As such, DDP 
acknowledges the unstructured environment that Agreement Officers operate in while 
crafting OTs, but offers “things to consider” in the DUSD (AT&L)  “OT Guide for 
Prototype Projects.”  [Ref. 4]  A recent General Accouting Office (GAO) report analyzed 
Section 845 OT agreements and determined that in general DOD’s Section 845 
agreements addressed many of the areas typically governed by standard FAR type 
contract provisions.  [Ref. 6: p. 13]  Perhaps this is due to the fact that the “OT Guide for 
Prototype Projects” list of things Agreement Officers should consider includes traditional 
contract topics such as price reasonableness, allowable costs, audit, termination and 
dispute processes, intellectual property rights, etc.  [Ref. 4] 
Even though many of DOD’s Section 845 agreements addressed areas typically 
governed by traditional FAR type contract provisions, they did not address them in 
traditional ways.  Part of GAO’s tasking in its recent study of DOD’s use of Section 845 
OTs was to identify how DOD tailored these agreements to address issues normally 
governed by standard contract provisions.  [Ref. 6: p. 1]  What they found is that 
regardless of the type of contractor (i.e., traditional vs. non-traditional), the agreement’s 
value, or the recipient’s contribution share of financial assets, DOD’s Section 845 
agreements all had several common themes, as follows: 
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• They relied on means other than certified cost and pricing data to establish 
a fair and reasonable price for the effort undertaken. 
• They allowed contractors to use Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP) rather than Government cost accounting standards. 
• They limited the Government’s audit rights, generally by omitting: 1) the 
requirement that the clause be included in subcontracts, and 2) the 
requirement that provided GAO access to the prime and subcontractor 
books and records. 
• They paid contractors a specified amount based on the accomplishment of 
agreed to technical milestones, rather than on the basis of incurred costs.   
• They did not provide DOD a right to terminate an effort for default by the 
contractor. 
• They authorized the use of an alternative dispute resolution process that 
provided for a more streamlined and shortened process.  [Ref. 6: p. 13] 
In addition to the above list, many of the Section 845 agreements that GAO 
looked at also provided considerable flexibility to the prime contractors regarding their 
management of subcontractor issues.  [Ref. 6: p. 13]  For example, a large number of the 
agreements completely waived the requirement for prime contractors to select their subs 
competitively and only two of the agreements that they analyzed required the contractor 
to notify the Government of their intent to award subcontracts when they exceeded a pre-
determined dollar threshold.  [Ref. 6: p. 13]  At first glance, it appears that the key 
elements of DOD’s Section 845 agreements could address many of the previously 
identified common barriers to attracting non-traditional companies to the defense market.  
Now the question becomes, how well did they? 
 
D. SUMMARY 
DOD is operating in an environment today that is almost 180 degrees out from ten 
years ago.  Today, we aren’t completely sure who our adversaries are, defense budgets 
and military R&D spending experienced great decline from FY 1988 until FY 1998, the 
DTIB has essentially merged with the national industrial base and DOD reform efforts 
have started but are occurring at a much slower pace than the rapid globalization being 
fueled by private industry technology advancements.   
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In order to ensure our nation’s security and remain globally dominant in this new 
era, DOD must have access to the most superior technology on the planet.  As opposed to 
a decade ago when DOD funded and owned the most cutting edge technology, today 
commercial companies operating in commercial markets hold much of the world’s 
superior technology.  DOD simply does not have the resources today to fund comparable 
technology themselves.  Consequently, DOD is forced to rely on these commercial 
markets to satisfy its demand for the rapid insertion of superior technology into weapon 
systems at an affordable price.  Yet, studies suggest that significant barriers exist that 
prevent commercial industry from seeking business with the Government.  Therein lies 
the dilemma; in order to survive, DOD must tap into the technology held by commercial 
firms that neither need nor want their business.   
Section 845 agreements were developed for the primary purpose of attracting 
non-traditional companies to do business with DOD.  While current Section 845 guidance 
provides Agreement Officers with a framework for crafting OTs, it does not specifically 
delineate a format or require specific traditional contract clauses to be addressed.  
Interestingly enough, many of DOD’s Section 845 agreements contained common themes 
with respect to their method for addressing traditional contract provisions. This chapter 
examined the major issues surrounding DOD’s need to attract non-traditional companies 
to the defense market and also how Section 845 agreements have been structured to 
address these issues.  Understanding the issues provides the critical background necessary 
to properly examine DOD’s use of Section 845 OTA with respect to its primary 
legislative intent – to attract non-traditional firms to the defense market.  Chapter IV 
details a survey conducted of non-traditional companies that entered into their first 
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IV. SURVEY DATA PRESENTATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
DOD’s budget and R&D environments have changed dramatically over the past 
decade.  As Chapter III described, DOD is no longer in the driver’s seat when it comes to 
R&D spending, yet it still needs access to the world’s most cutting edge technology 
advances in order to successfully carry out its future strategies and missions.  Today, 
much of the nation’s research is being done in private industry, which means that it is 
being done outside of DOD’s span of control.  Consequently, DOD faces a situation in 
which it must compete with other organizations and companies in order to obtain the 
R&D and technology that it needs. 
For a number of years, both DOD and Government officials have expressed 
concerns that significant barriers exist which inhibit DOD’s ability to obtain and take 
advantage of the technological advances being made by the private sector.  DOD studies 
have been conducted throughout the last two decades in an effort to determine the nature 
and extent of these barriers.  OTA was developed as a method to overcome these barriers, 
and thus allow the Government to gain access to private sector technological advances.   
Chapter II discussed how OTA legislation has evolved significantly since its 
inception.  It was also pointed out that the most recent legislation, passed in October 
2000, now requires Section 845 agreements to include at least one non-traditional 
company participating to a significant extent in the DOD project; and if not, at least one 
third of the total cost of the project should be provided by parties other than the Federal 
Government.  So clearly, the primary legislative intent of Section 845 OTA today is to 
give DOD a tool to attract the non-traditional companies with the most cutting edge 
technology to the defense market.   
Ever since they were given Section 845 authority (FY 1994), DOD and DARPA 
have been periodically required to justify its benefits to lawmakers, primarily through an 
annual report to Congress on the use of OTs.  Consequently, there already exists much 
published data on DOD and DARPA’s perceived benefits to using Section 845 OTs, 
including which specific barriers they believe are being overcome as a result of using 
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OTs.   Despite the requirement for DOD to submit an annual report to Congress on its 
usage of OTs, there did not exist until FY 2001 any requirement for DOD to track 
specific OT performance metrics.  Rather, Agreement Officers were required to provide 
subjective inputs as to how they felt the OT contributed to a broadening of the DTIB or 
fostered new relationships and practices that supported the national security of the U.S.  
[Ref. 41]  Agreement Officers were required to provide some specific quantifiable data, 
but only in the form of cost-sharing figures between Federal and non-Federal 
participants.  [Ref. 41]  Thus substantial data exists on how the Government feels Section 
845 OTs are performing with respect to their legislative intent; however, much of it is 
subjective in nature. 
Chapter IV examines DOD’s use of Section 845 OTs during the period from FY 
1994 through FY 2000.  This chapter discusses a survey the researcher conducted with 
non-traditional companies that did business with the Government for the first time (from 
FY 94 – 00) using a Section 845 OT.  The survey results and data are then presented.  
Eventually, these results will be analyzed by comparing the non-traditional companies’ 
views of the Section 845 OT’s ability to live up to its legislative intent versus the 
Government’s perception of how well they are performing.   
 
B. SURVEY BACKGROUND 
1. Methodology 
A survey was conducted of companies that entered into agreements with DOD 
during the period from FY 1994 to FY 2000 using Section 845 OTs as the vehicle for 
their agreement.  Additionally, all of the companies surveyed were classified as non-
traditional companies (according to the Office of Secretary of Defense’s (OSD) 
definition) at the time that they entered into the OT agreement.  As previously mentioned, 
OSD defines a non-traditional company in the January 2001 Other Transactions Guide 
for Prototype Projects as follows: 
A business unit that has not, for a period of at least one year prior to the date 
of the OT agreement, entered into or performed on (1) any procurement 
contract that is subject to full coverage under the cost accounting standards 
prescribed pursuant to Section 26 of the Office of Federal Procurement 
Policy Act (41 U.S.C. 422) and the regulations implementing such section; or 
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(2) any other procurement contract in excess of $500,000 to carry out 
prototype projects or to perform basic, applied, or advanced research projects 
for a Federal agency.  [Ref. 4: DL1.12] 
 
The overall purpose of the survey was to examine DOD’s use of Section 845 OTs 
according to the authority’s primary legislative intent, which is to provide a method for 
DOD to attract non-traditional “cutting edge” companies to the defense market and after 
they are attracted, allow DOD to tap into their technology resources.  With that in mind, 
the survey was developed to address the following issues: 
• Was it the OT that attracted these non-traditional companies to do 
business with DOD?  Or, would they have done business with DOD at the 
time regardless of whether an OT was used or not? 
• Were the non-traditional companies that DOD did in fact conduct business 
with using OTs the kind that the legislation was designed for them to 
attract?  And if yes, how much of them did DOD attract (meaning, what 
percentage of their R&D and technology resources did the agreement give 
DOD access to?)? 
The researcher obtained the data on DOD and DARPA Section 845 OTs awarded 
between FY 1994 and FY 2000 from two sources; (1) published DOD Annual Reports on 
Cooperative Agreements and Other Transactions Entered into Under 10 USC 2371, and 
(2) a database maintained by Ms. Teresa Brooks at DUSD (AT&L).  Using these two 
sources, the researcher selected the companies that had both been awarded a Section 845 
OT and were classified as non-traditional at the time of the award and targeted the survey 
to these companies.   
It is important to point out that this thesis is not intended to determine DOD’s 
success rate of using Section 845 OTs to attract non-traditional companies.  Such an 
analysis would involve surveying commercial companies that had never done business 
with the Government with the intent of determining how OTs could be used to attract 
them.  The researcher took DOD’s success rate of attracting non-traditional companies as 
a given and therefore, targeted the surveys to the already “fixed pool” of non-traditional 
companies that had entered into a business relationship with DOD using an OT.  
Consequently, this survey focused exclusively on these relationships and was aimed at 
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determining whether the OTs, as the vehicle for these relationships, were living up to 
their authority’s intent  
The survey was administered electronically via the Naval Postgraduate School’s 
(NPS) Office of Strategic Planning, Educational Assessment and Institutional Research 
(SPEAR).  The survey questionnaire was prepared using the “SurveySaid” online survey 
software and distributed to non-traditional companies via a link contained within an 
introductory and explanatory e-mail.  Non-traditional company e-mail addresses were 
found using worldwide web searches and/or through contact with Agreement Officers.  In 
an effort to encourage frank participation, survey respondents were promised anonymity.  
Consequently, aside from the general demographic questions, there is no way to 
specifically link survey response data to a particular company.  Survey respondents were 
given one month to complete their survey and were directed to return it electronically by 
clicking a “submit” button at the end of the survey.  Survey response data were 
accumulated centrally within the SPEAR office and then processed by the researcher 
using the “SurveySaid” software.   
2. Pool 
DOD and DARPA combined administered 245 new Section 845 OTs from FY 
1994 through FY 2000.  [Ref. 42]  Figure 4, Chapter II, provided the specific breakdown 
of the number of new Section 845 OTs administered per fiscal year during this same 
period.  Of note, DOD and DARPA did issue additional Section 845 OTs during this 
period (i.e., above and beyond the 245 figure).  However, they were for modifications to 
existing OT arrangements and this thesis focused exclusively on new awards. 
According to DUSD’s (AT&L) Section 845 OT database, 85 (35 percent) of the 
245 new OT agreements involved non-traditional participants.  [Ref. 42]  These 85 new 
OT agreements that involved non-traditional company participants were the “fixed pool” 
of companies to which the researcher targeted the surveys.  Figure 7, taken from a DUSD 
(AT&L) slide-show presentation, provides a specific breakdown according to the 
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 Figure 7: Percentage of new OTs that include non-traditional company participants, from 
FY 94 – FY 00, [Ref. 23] 
 
The numbers 245 and 85 represent the number of total agreements and number of 
agreements involving non-traditional participants, not the total number of participants 
and non-traditional participants respectively involved in those agreements.  Much like a 
traditional contract arrangement, each of the OT agreements contained various 
combinations and numbers of prime and subcontractor team participants.   
It is important to further breakdown the agreements by the numbers of non-
traditional participants involved and the level (e.g., prime or subcontractor) at which they 
resided.  On a macro level, the 245 new OT agreements involved 475 total participants 
(which includes both prime level and subcontractor level participants).  Of these 475 
participants, 119 were classified as non-traditional companies.  These 119 non-traditional 
participants also represent the “fixed pool” of companies that the researcher targeted.  A 
further breakdown of the 119 non-traditional participants into the prime contractor 
category reveals that 30 (35 percent) out of the 85 agreements involved non-traditional 
prime companies.  Given that each OT only had one prime contractor, this means that 30 
out of the 119 (or 25 percent) non-traditional participants were prime contractors and the 
remaining 89 non-traditional companies were acting as sub-contractors. 
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3. Submission and Response 
The survey was sent to a total of 76 companies, which represents 64 percent of the 
119 total non-traditional participants.  The researcher chose the 76 companies based 
purely on the availability of company point of contact information (e.g., phone number 
and e-mail addresses).  Considering that a large percentage of the agreements dated back 
several years (fiscal years 95, 96, 97 and 98), the researcher discovered many situations 
where companies either were bought out by other companies or failed to exist any more.  
The 76 companies targeted, however, did represent a good mix of prime and 
subcontractor companies.  Of the 76 non-traditional companies that were sent surveys, 22 
were prime contractors and 54 were subcontractors, representing 73 percent and 61 
percent of the total non-traditional prime and sub-contractor companies respectively.   
Of the 76 non-traditional companies solicited, six were returned within the one- 
month time constraint.  This represents an 8 percent response rate.  After the survey 
cutoff date, the researcher aggressively pursued communications with the Agreement 
Offices responsible for 17 of the most recent (e.g., FYs 99 and 00) OTs involving non-
traditional prime participants in an attempt to gather more accurate company point of 
contact information (and thus, better target the surveys within the companies).  As a 
result, one additional response was received and was included in the data analysis, 
bringing the total number of responses up to seven (and a 9 percent response rate). 
    
C. SURVEY QUESTIONS AND RESULTS 
1. Companies Attracted 
Questions 1-7 served the purpose of acquiring demographic information regarding 
the responding companies.  These questions were aimed at determining the companies’ 
industry, primary products or services, annual sales volume, annual R&D budget, prime 
versus sub-contractor characterization, position relative to rest of industry with respect to 
the amount of DOD business conducted and history of conducting business with other 
Federal Government agencies.  Aside from providing a method for categorizing the 
survey results, the demographic questions were developed to also help determine whether 
these non-traditional companies that DOD did conduct business with using an OT were in 
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fact the type that the Section 845 OT legislation had hoped they would attract (e.g., 
companies operating in exclusively commercial markets that invested heavily in 
technology and R&D). 
Question 1 asked respondents to fill in their company’s primary product or 
service.  All seven survey respondents answered this question and with the exception of 
two companies, responded with different answers.  At first glance, it appears that 
products and services vary greatly, but all might involve advanced information 
technology.  The answers to this question for all seven respondents are displayed in Table 
3: 
 
Respondent Primary Product or Service 
1 Image Processing Products and Service 
2 Communications and Avionics Software 
3 Training Software, Technical Services and Program Management 
4 Advanced Modeling and Tactical Simulation 
5 R&D, Manufacturing, Test and Launch of Inflated Space Structures
6 Mitigation of Radio Interference Products and Services 
7 Communications and Avionics Software 
 
Table 3: Companies’ Primary Product or Service [Developed by Researcher] 
 
 
Question 2 asked the companies to identify their primary industry.  All seven 






Respondent Primary Industry 
1 Military – Department of Defense 
2 Software 
3 Professional Engineering Services 
4 Information Technology and Engineering Services 
5 Aerospace Industry 
6 Communications Electronics 
7 Software 
 
Table 4: Companies’ Primary Industry [Developed by Researcher] 
 
It’s interesting to note that Respondent 1 listed their primary industry as 
military/DOD, yet they were classified according to DUSD’s (AT&L) definition as a 
non-traditional company.  This could be for one of two reasons.  First, the company 
might have been involved primarily in a non-DOD industry at the time they were 
awarded the OT, but subsequently accepted follow-on DOD work and therefore re-
structured to move primarily into the DOD market.  Another possibility is that they had 
primarily been a defense company, but for whatever reason had not conducted DOD 
business for the year prior to the OT arrangement, and thus qualified as a non-traditional 
company.  Without further information, it would be impossible to determine which of the 
two categories they fit into.  Regardless, they were classified as non-traditional at the 
time they were awarded the OT and will be considered as such for the purposes of this 
thesis.   
Question 3 asked the companies to identify their current annual sales volume.  
The researcher subdivided respondents into various categories of business sizes according 
to their annual sales volume.  Respondents were asked to characterize themselves in this 
respect by selecting one of the following five graduated categories that best matched their 
company’s current annual sales volume: 
• Under $1,000,000 
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• $1,000,000 - $5,000,000 
• $5,000,000 - $50,000,000 
• $50,000,000 - $100,000,000 
• Over $100,000,000 
 
All seven of the respondents answered Question 3 and the results are displayed in Figure 
8.   
 







Under $5,000,000 - Over 
$1,000,000 - $50,000,000 - 
 
                Figure 8: Company’s Annual Sales Volume [Developed by Researcher] 
 
The data in the graph indicate that all seven respondents fell into either one of two 
categories; $1,000,000 - $5,000,000 per year or $5,000,000 -$50,000,000.  Additionally, 
3 (or 47 percent of the respondents) placed themselves in the first category and the 
remaining 4 (or 57 percent of the respondents) placed themselves into the latter category.  
Without knowing the exact Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code for each 
respondent, it would be difficult to make a completely accurate assessment as to whether 
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these companies could be classified as large or small businesses, as businesses in 
different industries are judged by different standards.  [Ref. 43]  However, all of the 
survey respondents fell into an annual sales volume range of $1,000,000 - $50,000,000, 
which appears to tend toward the larger category of businesses.   
Question 4 asked the survey respondents to identify their company’s annual 
R&D/technology budget.  Recognizing that respondents would most likely list their 
current annual R&D/technology budget, the question specifically asked them to 
approximate over the last five years their average annual R&D/technology budget.  
Considering that the period being analyzed ranged from FY 94 – FY 00, the researcher 
felt that a budget figure averaged over the last five years would be a more appropriate 
number to consider when discussing how an OT agreement administered a few years ago 
allowed DOD to tap into their company’s technology resources.  For this question, 
respondents were given an open-ended space to respond so that their exact answers 
would be captured.  All seven respondents answered this question and the results are 
displayed in Table 5.  
Respondent Average Annual R&D/Technology Budget 
1 Internally funded: $60,000 












Question 5 asked the surveyed companies to categorize the relationship with 
DOD that resulted from the OT arrangement.  The thrust of this question was to 
determine if the respondent was either a prime contractor for DOD, part of a consortium 
of companies participating in the OT, or a sub-contractor to a prime that had formed a 
relationship with DOD using an OT.  Survey respondents were asked to place themselves 
into one of the following three categories that best described their company’s 
participation in the OT: 
• A one-to-one relationship involving only your company and DOD. 
• A part of a consortium of companies participating in the Other Transaction 
with DOD. 
• The result of a prime to sub-contractor relationship your company had 
with another firm that was doing business with DOD. 
All seven respondents answered this question and all seven fell into one of the two 
following categories; a) a one-to-one relationship involving only their company and 
DOD, or b) a prime to sub-contractor relationship their company had with another firm 
(e.g., the prime) that was doing business with DOD using an OT.  As it turned out, four 
of the seven (57 percent) fell into category (a), which identifies them as a prime 
contractor in an OT-based relationship.  Consequently, the remaining three (43 percent) 
can be characterized as non-traditional sub-contractors working for a prime that had an 
OT-based relationship with DOD.  Again, the anonymity of the survey precludes the 
researcher from determining exactly which prime or subcontractors these respondents 
were.  However, from a pure numbers perspective, this survey pool can now be identified 
to represent 13 percent (4 of 30) of the total number of non-traditional prime contractors 
and 3 percent (3 of 89) of the total number of non-traditional sub-contractors that 
conducted business with DOD from FY 94 to FY 00 using an OT. 
Question 6 asked respondents to characterize their company’s position with 
respect to their primary competitors in the industry and to indicate whether or not their 
competitors conducted business with DOD.  Additionally, this question specifically asked 
respondents to choose an answer that best characterizes their company’s position at the 
time they participated in the OT with DOD.  Respondents were giving the following three 
options and asked to select the one that best applied: 
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• The only company amongst our competitive industry that was doing 
business with DOD. 
• One of several companies within our competitive industry that was doing 
business with DOD. 
• The only company within our competitive industry that was not doing 
business with DOD. 
All seven respondents answered this question and all seven (100 percent) placed 
themselves in the same category; one of several companies within their competitive 
industry that was doing business with DOD.  This is very interesting in that there were 
companies in every one of the respondents’ industries that clearly were conducting 
business with DOD, yet before the OT arrangement, their company chose not to enter that 
market themselves.  So, at least for these respondents, it’s not a case where DOD 
accessed a previously untapped market using the OTs.  Without more specific 
information such as how much business their competitors were conducting with DOD, it 
would be difficult to make a statistically accurate assumption.  However, it appears, on 
the surface at least, that the DOD market existed for their industry, but significant enough 
reasons (possibly in the form of barriers) existed before the OT relationship to cause them 
to decide not to enter the DOD market. 
Question 7 asked the companies to simply indicate whether they had ever done 
business with any other Federal Government Agency prior to entering into the OT 
agreement with DOD.  Respondents were asked to select either “Yes” or “No.”  The 
results indicate that five of the seven (71 percent) companies had done business with 
another Federal Agency prior to their OT agreement with DOD and only two (29 percent) 
had not.  This is very surprising in that the DUSD (AT&L) definition of a non-traditional 
company does not focus exclusively on companies that do not do business with DOD.  
Rather, the definition is broad enough to include all Federal Government Agencies.  
Given that most Federal procurement rules apply to all Federal Agencies, it’s interesting 
to find that the majority of these respondents had conducted business with the Federal 
Government before, but not with DOD specifically.  
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2. Determining if the Other Transaction Attracted Them      
The purpose of questions 8, 9 and 10 was to solicit feedback from survey 
respondents as to whether it was the OT that attracted them to do business with DOD.  
And if it was, what was it about the OT that either attracted them, or at least, enabled 
them to participate in a business relationship with DOD. 
Question 8 asked respondents to cite the top five reasons why their company did 
not conduct business with DOD prior to the OT agreement.  Question 8 was designed to 
initially “set the stage” for this section by asking survey respondents to cite their top five 
reasons why their company did not conduct business with DOD prior to the OT 
agreement.  Several examples of “typical” reasons why companies choose not to do 
business with the Government, such as stringent audit requirements, technical data rights, 
restrictions on foreign access to technology, burdensome paperwork, etc, were given to 
the respondents as part of the question.  The purpose of this question was to encourage 
the respondents to identify their previous barriers to conducting business with DOD, so 
that later questions could ask which (if any) of these barriers were overcome as a result of 
using an OT.  Survey respondents were given an “open-ended” data area in which to 
provide their responses. 
None of the seven survey respondents answered Question 8.  After further 
investigation as to why there was a 0 percent response rate for this question, the 
researcher identified a technical “glitch” in the survey construction that prevented 
respondents from filling in anything for this question.  Unfortunately, it was not detected 
until all of the responses were received and processed.  However, a later question 
captured much of the same information that Question 8 was intended to set up.     
Question 9 directly targeted the issue of determining whether it was the OT that 
attracted them by asking if there were specific provisions of the OT agreement that 
enabled their participation in a business relationship with DOD.  Respondents were asked 
to simply answer either “yes” or “no.”  One hundred percent of the responding companies 
answered this question.  Figure 9 identifies the breakdown of responses according to the 







Figure 9: Determining If There Were Specific OT Provisions That Enabled Their 
Company’s Participation [Developed by Researcher] 
 
As the figure above indicates, five of the seven respondents (71 percent) answered 
“yes,” meaning that there were specific provisions in the OT that enabled their 
participation.  The remaining two (29 percent) selected “no.”  At first glance, it appears 
that 71 percent of the companies were attracted to the Defense market as a result of the 
OT.  For this group, the question now becomes what specific parts of the OT attracted 
them.  Conversely, Figure 9 also suggests that 29 percent of the respondents might have 
entered into a relationship with DOD, regardless of whether an OT was used or not.  
Without the specific data regarding their prior barriers to conducting business with DOD 
(i.e., Question 8), it is difficult to speculate with any accuracy at this point.  
Question 10 was designed as a follow-on question for those companies that 
answered, “yes” to Question 9.  The purpose of this question was to identify what 
specific provisions of the OT enabled them to participate in a business relationship with 
DOD.  One hundred percent of the eligible respondents answered this question.  Table 6 
identifies the specific answers to this question. 
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 Respondent Provisions of OT that enabled their participation 
1 Provisions which allowed us to capitalize the R&D 
2 Not eligible – answered “no” to Question 9 
3 Full commercial recoupment of IR&D 
4 Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) 
rules allowing non-competitive awards 
5 ACTD rules allowing non-competitive awards 
6 Retention of intellectual property rights 
7 Not eligible – answered “no” to Question 9 
 
Table 6: Specific OT Provisions That Enabled Their Participation [Developed by 
Researcher] 
 
At this stage, it is difficult to make any assumptions regarding central themes in 
OT provisions.  It is interesting to note that two companies responded with the exact 
same answer (e.g., “ACTD rules allowing non-competitive awards”).  The overall 
diversity of the data set could, however, provide an argument that every OT and every 
business relationship is unique in its own respect.  Further data and analysis will build on 
this theme.     
3. Tapping into Non-Traditional Technology 
The purpose of Questions 11, 12 and 13 was to specifically identify how much of 
the non-traditional companies’ R&D resources DOD had access to during the 
performance of their OT agreement.  Clearly, this section directly addresses the heart of 
this thesis, which is to analyze DOD’s use of Section 845 OTs as a method of tapping 
into non-traditional R&D resources.  The latter two questions carry this theme even 
farther by determining if the initial relationship formed using the OT enabled DOD to 
continue tapping into the companies’ R&D resources (e.g., “opened the door” to follow-
on relationships).  
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Question 11 asked the survey respondents to estimate the percentage of their 
company’s total R&D/technology resources to which DOD had access both before the 
OT-based business relationship was formed and after.  Eighty six percent of the 
companies responded to this question and the results are summarized in Table 7. 
 
Respondent Percentage of R&D Resources DOD Tapped Into 
1 Did not answer the question 
2 Before: 25% 
After: 90% 
3 Before: 90% 
After:  90% (but at a 200% greater dollar value) 
4 Before: 90% 
After: 90% 
5 Before: 90% 
After: 90% 
6 Before: 20% 
After: 30% 
7 Before: 25% 
After: 90% 
 
Table 7:  Percentage of Non-Traditional R&D Resources DOD Tapped Into – Before and 
After the OT Agreement [Developed by Researcher] 
 
Much like the answers to previous questions, there appears to be no central theme 
to these answers.  Fifty percent of the time, DOD did not have any greater access to the 
non-traditional suppliers’ R&D resources as a result of the OT.  However, in 33 percent 
of the cases, DOD had significantly greater access to non-traditional R&D resources after 
66 
the OT-based relationship was formed.  Without specific knowledge as to the type or 
value of the technology gained, it is difficult to make judgments regarding any benefits 
that DOD might have gained as a result of having access to a greater percentage of non-
traditional R&D.  
Question 12 asked companies to indicate whether their OT-based relationship 
with DOD  “opened the door” to follow-on business with the Department.  Respondents 
were asked to simply indicate either “yes” or “no.”  Figure 10 identifies the breakdown of 







Figure 10: Identifying Whether Follow On Business With DOD Was Pursued After The 
OT-Based Relationship [Developed by Researcher] 
 
Figure 10 indicates that in 71 percent of the cases, the OT-based relationship led 
to follow-on business with DOD.  As pointed out previously in Chapter II, current OT 
legislation specifically states that Section 845 OTs should be crafted in such as way as to 
encourage the non-traditional companies to pursue follow-on business with DOD.  
Current OT regulations also point out that DOD is encouraged to use traditional FAR-
based fixed-price type contracts as the vehicle for forming these follow-on relationships.  
The next survey question addresses this very point. 
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A deeper look at the two companies that did not participate in follow on business 
with DOD after their OT agreement reveals a couple of interesting facts.  First, one of 
these companies stated in a previous answer that there were no specific provisions in the 
OT that encouraged them to participate in the Defense market.  This answer alone might 
lead one to believe that perhaps the company would have done business with DOD 
regardless of whether they used an OT or not.  Yet the same company did not participate 
in follow-on business with DOD after the OT agreement was finished.  Even more 
interesting is the fact that this same company indicated that they had conducted business 
with other Federal Government agencies prior to their OT relationship with the 
Government.  On the surface, these facts seem to conflict with each other.  It is difficult 
to make any sort of judgment without further information as to why the company did not 
participate in follow on DOD business.   
The second company that did not participate in follow on business indicated in the 
previous question that there were specific provisions in the OT agreement that enabled 
them to participate in a relationship with DOD.  This case would seem to make more 
sense if DOD did in fact encourage this company to participate in future business, but 
with a traditional FAR-based contract as the vehicle (instead of an OT).  The OT might 
have been the only reason the company participated in a relationship and without it, the 
barriers would be too great for them to continue.  Of course, additional information 
would be required in order to confirm this.  
Question 13 was designed as a follow-on to the previous question.  Question 13 
asked the companies that participated in follow-on business with DOD after the OT (i.e., 
companies that answered “yes” to Question 12) to identify the type of vehicle they used 
to form the follow-on relationships with DOD.  Respondents were asked to pick one of 
the following three choices: 
• Traditional Government procurement contracts. 
• Additional OT agreements. 
• Both traditional Government procurement contracts and OT agreements. 
Eighty percent of the companies that participated in follow-on business with DOD 
















Figure 11: Type Of Vehicle Used To Form Follow-On Relationships With DOD 
[Developed by Researcher] 
 
Figure 11 indicates that one company used purely traditional FAR-based contracts 
as the vehicle for their follow-on relationships with DOD.  Additionally, further research 
reveals that this same company had also done business with other Federal Government 
agencies prior to their OT agreement with DOD.  Consequently, they may already have 
had the infrastructure in place to prepare and administer traditional FAR-based 
Government contracts.  If this was in fact the case, then one might ask why they had not 
entered the Defense market before.  
Figure 11 also reveals that one company participated in follow-on business with 
DOD using additional OTs as the vehicle.  There are a couple of interesting facts 
regarding this statistic.  First, it runs directly counter to the OT regulations, which state 
that DOD should pursue future relationships with non-traditional companies (although 
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they wouldn’t be non-traditional anymore at that point) using traditional contracts.  
Secondly, this same company responded to Question 9 by indicating that there were no 
specific provisions in the OT that enabled their participation in the Defense market.  
Again, this fact alone could be interpreted to mean that they would have done business 
with DOD regardless of whether an OT was used or not.  However, the fact that they 
participated in follow-on business using an OT, rather than a traditional contract, would 
run contradictory to this interpretation. 
4. Benefits of an Other Transaction 
The purpose of Question 14 was to get survey respondents to identify any benefits 
they perceived DOD gained as a result of the OT agreement with their company.  Reports 
have been published that detail DOD’s perceptions of the benefits they have gained as a 
result of using Section 845 OTs.  [Ref. 6]  In fact, DOD produces an annual report to 
Congress that specifically identifies the benefits they feel have been obtained as a result 
of having the authority.  This researcher also believes that it is important for DOD 
officials and Agreement Officers to be aware of the non-traditional suppliers’ perceptions 
on this issue as well.  Clearly, Agreement Officers must have a better understanding of 
the benefits of OTs from the suppliers’ perspective if they are going to be successful in 
crafting OTs that will attract more non-traditional companies in the future.     
Question 14 asked the non-traditional companies to identify, in their opinion, the 
benefits DOD received as a result of participating in the business relationship with their 
company.  Eighty six percent of the respondents answered this question.  Table 8 presents 
below the opinions from each respondent. 
While each of the respondents answered this question a little differently, it 
appears that one central theme amongst the group did surface, which is their belief that 
DOD primarily benefited by gaining access to more current technology.  This fact alone 
is encouraging in that the primary legislative intent of Section 845 OTA is for DOD to 
use it as a tool for tapping into “cutting edge” commercial technology.  Given these 
results, it appears that at least the non-traditional suppliers are attuned to this intent.  As 
previously cited in Chapter II, DOD officials routinely point out many other benefits to 
using Section 845 OTs, such as helping to streamline acquisition practices and processes 
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without having to apply for a waiver from statute or regulation and giving Agreement 
Officers flexibility in negotiating Intellectual Property rights.  [Ref. 6]   
 
Respondent Benefits to DOD 
1 Unique statement of work that meets both military and 
commercial needs (e.g., dual use) 
2 * Did not answer the question * 
3 Access to emerging commercial technology. 
4 Better, faster, cheaper technology at no investment cost. 
5 Unique commercial products and processes and better, cheaper
and more readily available technology. 
6 Too early to tell.  Other efforts far from complete. 
7 Access to updated technology. 
 
Table 8: Non-Traditional Supplier Perception of DOD Benefits [Developed by 
Researcher] 
 
5. Non-Traditional Arrangements and Practices 
The purpose of this section of questions was to identify central tenets of the non-
traditional companies’ commercial market business relationships and any best business 
practices they utilize to evaluate future business relationships.  This kind of information 
could be extremely valuable to DOD officials and Agreement Officers as it might help 
them to structure OTs that are more attractive to non-traditional companies. 
  Question 15 asked the non-traditional companies to identify the ways in which 
their OT agreement with DOD mirrored the business relationships with their private 
industry customers that had the most access to their R&D efforts.  Eighty six percent of 
the respondents answered this question and the results are displayed in Table 9. 
 
71 
Respondent Ways in which the OT mirrored commercial arrangements 
1 On issues regarding retention of critical Intellectual Property 
2 * Did not answer the question * 
3 None – it does not mirror commercial arrangements in any way.
4 No specifics, but both were crafted to allow better technology, 
lower prices plus higher return. 
5 Mirrors them in most ways 
6 Mirrors them in most ways 
7 None – it does not mirror commercial arrangements in any way.
  
Table 9: Way In Which OTs Mirror Private Industry Business Relationships [Developed 
by Researcher] 
   
 The data contained in Table 9 indicate that the answers to this question are split.  
Fifty percent of the companies responded by saying that none of the specific tenets of the 
OT mirrored their commercial business arrangements in any way, while the remaining 
half either mirrored them in most ways or in Respondent 1’s case, in one major area 
(critical IP).  
Obviously, the data from this survey group are not overwhelmingly skewed in 
either direction.  However, there is an interesting fact associated with this question.  The 
three respondents who indicated that OTs did not mirror their commercial business 
arrangements all belonged to similar industries: software and advanced modeling.  In 
contrast, the other three companies who responded by saying OTs did mirror their 
commercial arrangements operated in completely different industries.  Given this 
information, it is quite possible that the answer to the question of how OTs mirror 
commercial arrangements is industry dependent.  If this is in fact true, DOD Agreement 
Officers need to understand the particular nuances of the industry they are targeting if 
they are to be successful at crafting OTs that would attract non-traditional companies 
from that industry. 
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Question 16 asked the survey respondents to identify areas that their company 
feels are the most important to consider when evaluating whether to pursue a business 
relationship with a new commercial customer or establish ground in a new market.  
Eighty six percent of the respondents answered this question and the results are displayed 
in Table 10. 
Respondent Areas to consider when evaluating new relationships or 
markets 
1 Potential for long term relationship, Return on Investment, 
ability to retain IP 
2 * Did not answer the question * 
3 Market potential (i.e., $-wise), enterprise potential 
4 All of the above (“All of the above” refers to the examples 
cited in actual survey question: dollar size and profitability of 
deal, potential for long-term relationship, ease of negotiations, 
protection of technical data rights and proprietary information, 
flexibility of business arrangement and ability to allow global 
access to technology.) 
5 Relationship with DOD and all of the above (All of the above” 
refers to examples cited in actual survey question: dollar size 
and profitability of deal, potential for long-term relationship, 
ease of negotiations, protection of technical data rights and 
proprietary information, flexibility of business arrangement and 
ability to allow global access to technology.) 
6 Potential for long-term profitable relationship. 
7 Potential for long-term relationship, ability to retain data rights 
and Return on Investment. 
 
Table 10: Areas Companies Consider When Evaluating New Relationships or Markets 
[Developed by Researcher] 
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The purpose of this question was to provide insight into the things that non-
traditional companies feel are necessary in order to encourage them to pursue a new 
business relationship or enter into a new market.  If DOD is going to be successful in 
using Section 845 OTs to attract non-traditional companies to the defense market, it first 
must understand what motivates these non-traditional companies to seek new business.  
While each of the respondents gave slightly different answers, their specific answers do 
not appear to be surprising.  In fact, the DOD studies referenced in Chapter III identify 
many of these same issues as being common barriers to preventing non-traditional 
companies from entering the Defense market.  If nothing else, these responses prove that 
Agreement Officers must clearly understand what motivates the companies they are 
trying to attract and that each company has their own unique motivators.  If they fail to do 
so, their OTs may not accomplish its mission. 
 
D. SUMMARY 
This chapter examined DOD/non-traditional supplier OT-based relationships from 
the suppliers’ perspective.  Different facets of the relationship were looked at using a 
survey specifically targeted at non-traditional commercial companies that conducted 
business (from FY 94-00) with DOD for the first time using a Section 845 OT as the 
vehicle for structuring their relationship. The survey’s results identified a number of 
different themes regarding the type of non-traditional companies that were attracted, the 
reasons why they were attracted, the extent that DOD accessed their R&D resources as a 
result of the relationship and ways in which the OT agreement compared with 
commercial industry business relationships.    
The next chapter will analyze these themes with respect to DOD’s views on the 






V. DATA ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter detailed a survey the researcher conducted with companies 
that satisfied both of the following two criteria: (1) participated in a business relationship 
with DOD using a Section 845 OT as the vehicle for structuring that relationship; and (2) 
were classified according to DUSD (AT&L) as non-traditional companies at the time 
they participated in the OT-based relationship.  The overall purpose of the survey was to 
get non-traditional companies’ views on issues regarding DOD’s use of Section 845 OTs.  
Chapter IV presented the survey data and identified areas that seem to suggest common 
themes amongst the survey respondents.  More specifically, interesting commonalities 
were found in the survey data pertaining to the type of non-traditional companies that 
DOD attracted to the defense market, the reasons why they were attracted, the extent to 
which DOD accessed their R&D resources during the relationship and the ways in which 
the OT agreement compared with their commercial industry business relationships.      
Since it was given Section 845 authority in the late 1990’s, DOD was tasked to 
report to Congress and Government officials on the benefits of its use.  Chapter II 
described in detail Congressional intent in providing DOD with this authority and 
Chapter III discussed why it is so important for DOD to have the ability to access private 
industry’s “cutting edge” R&D resources.   Consequently, there already exists much 
published information on DOD’s use of Section 845 OTs and its perceived benefits to 
having the authority.   
This chapter further explores the issues identified in Chapter IV by providing an 
analysis of those issues with respect to DOD’s use of Section 845 OTs and its perceived 
benefits for using the authority.  Facts regarding DOD’s use of the authority and its 
perceived benefits are obtained from the following sources: 
• 2000 GAO report entitled DOD’s Guidance on Using Section 845 
Agreements Could be Improved  [Ref. 6] 
• 2001 GAO report entitled Information on the Federal Framework and 
DOD’s Other Transaction Authority [Ref. 44] 
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• FY 94 – FY 00 DOD Annual Reports on Cooperative Agreements and 
Other Transactions Entered into Under 10 USC 2371 [Ref. 41] 
 
B. NON-TRADITIONAL COMPANIES ATTRACTED 
1. Classification Issues 
 Chapter II provided a detailed account of how OTA evolved from its original 
form as it was given to DARPA in 1989.  Included in that account was a description of 
the most recent revision to Section 845 authority, Section 803, which clearly re-directed 
the legislation’s focus toward providing DOD with a tool to help it attract non-traditional 
companies and thus, tap into their R&D resources.  DOD’s Director of Defense 
Procurement (DDP) was given the responsibility to define a non-traditional company and 
track their participation in Section 845 OT-based relationships accordingly. 
One issue that surfaced regarding DOD’s ability to attract non-traditional 
companies simply involves the definition of a non-traditional company.  As stated 
previously in Chapter IV, DDP identified and tracked non-traditional company 
participation in Section 845 OT relationships according to the following definition:    
A business unit that has not, for a period of at least one year prior to the date 
of the OT agreement, entered into or performed on (1) any procurement 
contract that is subject to full coverage under the cost accounting standards 
prescribed pursuant to Section 26 of the Office of Federal Procurement 
Policy Act (41 U.S.C. 422) and the regulations implementing such section; or 
(2) any other procurement contract in excess of $500,000 to carry out 
prototype projects or to perform basic, applied, or advanced research projects 
for a Federal agency.  [Ref. 4: DL1.12] 
 
Clearly this definition is meant to apply to companies that have not participated in 
business relationships with any Federal Government agency (in accordance with the 
stated parameters), not just DOD.  Yet, question seven of the survey asked respondents to 
identify whether they had ever done business with another Federal Government agency 
prior to the entering into the OT agreement with DOD and 71 percent of the companies 
responded “yes,” meaning that they had done business with other Federal agencies prior 
to entering into the OT agreement with DOD.  Apparently however, these companies had 
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not done business with another Federal agency within a year prior to the OT agreement 
date. 
  Chapter II detailed Section 845 OTA’s current legislative intent, which is to 
provide DOD a tool to entice “leading edge” commercial companies that previously did 
not conduct business with it to enter the defense market so that their technology can be 
leveraged for military use. Chapter III discussed technology trends in the DTIB and 
private industry over the last decade and profiled the type of “leading edge” companies 
that DOD needs to attract.  The facts presented in Chapter III indicate the companies that 
DOD needs to attract currently own two-thirds of the nation’s advanced technology and 
also are not currently doing business with the Federal Government on any level.   
Interestingly enough, the survey results suggest that even though the companies 
that DOD is classifying and tracking as “non-traditional” meet its definition, they may 
not truly live up to the spirit of the definition of a non-traditional company.  It is difficult 
to imagine that a company’s barriers to participating in the defense market would be 
much different than their barriers to participating in the Federal Government market in 
general.  According to DOD studies cited in Chapter III, many of the “leading edge” 
companies that DOD is trying to attract are choosing not to conduct business with it 
because of those barriers.  Therefore, it is also difficult to imagine that a company that 
participated in recent Federal Government business (excluding the defense market) is the 
same kind of company that DOD needs to attract.   
Even though DDP was given the responsibility to define and track for DOD non-
traditional company participation, there exists confusion within the Federal Government 
as to what constitutes a non-traditional company.  In their 2000 report entitled DOD’s 
Guidance on Using Section 845 Agreements Could be Improved, GAO raised this issue.  
Specifically, it is pointed out that DOD’s Inspector General (DODIG) independently 
collected non-traditional company participation in Section 845 OT statistics, but defined 
a non-traditional company as one that had not performed research on cost-based contracts 
or that had been subject to an audit by Defense Contract Audit Agency within the past 3 
years.  [Ref. 6: p. 14]   
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This represents a dramatically different interpretation of a non-traditional 
company than DDP’s.  This difference may explain why there also exist some 
inconsistencies amongst DOD Agreement Officers’ comments in their annual report to 
Congress and DDP’s classification of the supplier.  For instance, DDP classified a prime 
supplier involved in a Section 845 OT agreement as non-traditional and tracked it as 
such.  However, the Agreement Officer specifically stated in that year’s DOD report to 
Congress on its use of OTs that even though the OT yielded participation from a 
traditional defense contractor, the OT agreement encouraged a closer relationship 
between the Government and the contractor than would normally be permitted under a 
FAR-type contract.  [Ref. 41]  Clearly, the Agreement Officer perceived the supplier as 
being a traditional defense contractor (possibly as a result of that company’s familiarity 
with Government acquisition procedures), but DOD was tracking it as a non-traditional 
company.  Again, it is not likely that these are the kinds of companies that the legislation 
was designed to attract. 
 
2. Industry and Market Issues 
The private industry technology trends of the last decade that were discussed in 
Chapter III suggest that there are many high technology industries and markets out there 
to which DOD has very little if any access e.g., certain “high tech” communications and 
electronics markets.  The specific barriers that prevent DOD from having access to these 
industries and markets were also discussed.  First of all, it is not difficult to conclude that 
these high technology industries and markets contain precisely the type of non-traditional 
companies that DOD is trying to attract.  And secondly, it is not difficult to conclude that 
the companies operating in these unique markets have little if any Government 
experience, are chasing many of the same kinds of customers, and therefore, are most 
likely unaware of emerging Government business opportunities (because they don’t 
operate in the same “circles” as DOD). 
Question six of the survey asked the respondents to characterize their company’s 
position relative to their primary competitors with respect to the level of DOD business 
being conducted.  Specifically, they were asked to select one of the following three 
options: 1) the only company within their competitive market doing business with DOD, 
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2) one of several companies within their market doing business with DOD, or 3) the only 
company within their market not doing business with DOD.  Ironically, 100 percent of 
the respondents indicated they were one of several companies within their competitive 
market conducting business with DOD.   
These results completely contradict the belief that the companies DOD needs to 
attract are operating in virtually untapped industries and markets.  Obviously in the cases 
represented by the survey data, DOD attracted “non-traditional” companies that were 
operating in markets that have already been tapped by DOD.  Given this fact, one could 
question whether the technology DOD accessed as a result of the OT-based relationship 
could have been obtained from any of the other companies that DOD was already doing 
business with in that same market.  And even if not, what was the benefit to DOD of this 
technology as compared to the technology available in the untapped markets? In other 
words, given a finite funding level, shouldn’t DOD be pursing the technology in the 
untapped markets?  Of course, these would be difficult questions to answer without any 
further data.  
The fact that 100 percent of the survey respondents categorized themselves as one 
of several companies operating in their competitive market that was doing business with 
DOD may not be surprising considering the way that DOD markets its Section 845 OTs.  
In several of the comment sections in DOD’s annual report to Congress on its use of OTs, 
Agreement Officers explicitly stated that they attracted the non-traditional company using 
a Broad Agency Announcement (BAA) or Commerce Business Daily (CBD) solicitation.  
[Ref. 41]  It stands to reason that companies operating in predominantly defense markets 
(even though they may not currently be doing business with DOD) are going to be 
reading the “traditional” defense solicitations.  Likewise, the companies that are 
operating in the untapped DOD markets are operating in their own unique circles and 
therefore, are not going to be reading publications such as the CBD or noticing BAAs.  
Based on these facts, one might argue whether the non-traditional companies that were 
actually attracted are truly the type of non-traditional companies that the legislation 
intended it to attract.    
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C. BENEFITS     
 Other Transaction Authority in general represents a radical departure from the 
statutes and regulations that frame DOD’s traditional contracting environment.  In a 
traditional contracting scenario, DOD agents are accountable for adhering to all 
applicable rules and regulations.  In many cases, these rules and regulations embody 
principles such as strong Government control and oversight, adherence to rigid contract 
specifications and the promotion of future competition.  In contrast, Section 845 OTA 
provides DOD agents with tremendous flexibility, but a flexibility that can only be 
utilized for a few specific purposes (which are cited in Chapter II).   
1. Tapping Into Commercial Research and Development  
Congress developed Section 845 OTA and gave it to DOD in order to fulfill 
specific purposes.  DUSD (AT&L) identifies its perspective on DOD’s purpose for using 
Section 845 OTA in its 2001 OT Guide. 
It is in DOD’s interest to tap into the research and development being 
accomplished by non-traditional defense contractors, and to pursue 
commercial solutions to defense requirements.  One justifiable use of this 
authority is to attract non-traditional defense contractors that participate to a 
significant extent in the prototype project.  [Ref. 4: Section C1.5] 
 
It is no surprise that DUSD’s (AT&L) stated purpose for Section 845 mirrors the 
legislation’s primary stated purpose, which is to give DOD the ability to attract non-
traditional suppliers and ultimately access their technology resources.  As previously 
mentioned, several issues exist regarding DOD’s ability to not only attract non-traditional 
companies in general, but also its ability to attract the right kind of non-traditional 
companies.  In addition, evidence suggests that there is also reason to analyze DOD’s 
success in using OTs as a method for tapping into commercial R&D resources. 
As mentioned numerous times throughout this thesis, DOD’s most frequently 
stated primary expected benefit to using Section 845 OTA is to give it access to more 
non-traditional R&D resources.  There is no disputing the fact that this is really the 
authority’s primary intent.  Congress placed it in the legislation’s language.  DUSD 
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(AT&L) stated it in its most current OT regulatory document and GAO identified it in a 
2000 report as DOD’s most often cited expected benefit.  [Ref. 6: p. 13]   
Yet, given all of the publicity that this expected benefit attained, DOD has not 
identified any quantifiable evidence to measure its success at accessing non-traditional 
R&D resources.  Chapter IV identified and discussed data pertaining to DOD’s success 
rate at attracting non-traditional companies.  However, the larger question involving how 
much of the non-traditional R&D resources were tapped into has never been quantified or 
tracked.  GAO stated in its 2000 report on DOD’s use of Section 845 OTs that there were 
previous attempts made by DOD to do so, but they were unsuccessful. 
 DOD officials told us they have been attempting to determine the extent that 
commercial firms were participating on Section 845 agreements since 
October 1997.  At that time, DOD established a requirement for Agreement 
Officers to provide a report, which was to identify (among other things) 
whether the prime contractor or consortium members had performed any 
prior research efforts for DOD.  This requirement, however, may not result in 
any meaningful indicators of the expected benefits.  [Ref. 6: pp. 13-14] 
 
Interestingly enough, DUSD’s (AT&L) April 2000 OT Guide established a new 
requirement for Agreement Officers to track as a metric the involvement of non-
traditional contractors that participate to a significant extent in a prototype project 
administered using an OT.  [Ref. 4]  However, this metric is intended to only identify and 
track the fact that a company is non-traditional and only so that DOD’s success rate of 
attracting non-traditional companies using OTs can be more easily quantified.  Again, 
this does nothing to address the more important question regarding how much of the non-
traditional companies’ R&D resources DOD was able to tap into using the OT. 
 In an effort to actually address this idea, survey question 11 asked the non-
traditional respondents to identify the percentage of their companies’ R&D efforts to 
which DOD had access both before and after the OT-based business relationship was 
formed.  Exactly half of the respondents stated that DOD had access to 90 percent of their 
companies’ technology both before and after their participation in the OT agreement.  
Clearly, the OT had no impact on the amount of non-traditional R&D resources that 
DOD had access to in these situations.  Additionally, only in 33 percent of the cases did 
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DOD have access to a significantly greater amount of the companies’ R&D resources 
after the OT-based relationship was formed.  One other interesting fact exists regarding 
the 50 percent of the cases in which the OT had no impact on DOD’s ability to tap into 
non-traditional R&D resources.  Every one of these companies indicated they had 
participated in business relationships with other Government agencies prior to their OT 
relationship with DOD.  Consequently, it might be quite possible that these companies 
are only non-traditional by definition, and actually have been operating in the defense 
market before (but just not in the last year). 
A question in the survey’s demographics section asked respondents to 
approximate their companies’ average annual R&D budget over the last 5 years.  The 
results were surprising.  Only 29 percent of the respondents had annual R&D budgets of 
one million dollars or more.  Even more surprising was the fact that the remaining 71 
percent had annual internal R&D budgets of half a million dollars or less.  In terms of 
today’s high technology dominated industries, these annual R&D budgets represent very 
small numbers.  This fact, in combination with the relatively small access to R&D 
resources DOD seemed to have gained after the OT arrangement, provides further 
evidence that OTs are not attracting the right kind of non-traditional companies. 
Of course the pure amount of a non-traditional company’s R&D resources that 
DOD tapped into may not always be the most accurate means for determining the value 
of its benefit obtained.  The matching of a specific technology type to a specific DOD 
need for that technology could be just as valuable, regardless of how much of that 
company’s total R&D resources it represented.  For example, an Agreement Officer 
stated the following benefit in DOD’s FY 2000 report to Congress on its use of OTs: 
The use of an OT has resulted in an additional benefit, not addressed above.  
Arc fault detection technology is a recent development and the methods of 
identifying how an electrical arc starts fires are still under investigation.  
However, the promise of detecting arc faults and interrupting them before a 
fire starts is a great concern within the Navy maintenance and air safety 
community.  [Ref. 41] 
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2. Other Benefits 
GAO’s 2000 report on DOD’s use of Section 845 OTs stated the following as the 
three top expected benefits to using OTs most often cited by DOD officials; 1) the use of 
commercial products or processes, 2) attracting commercial firms, and 3) increased 
flexibility in negotiating terms and conditions.  [Ref. 6: p. 12]  The number one most 
often cited expected benefit, the use of commercial products or processes, refers to the 
issue of tapping into non-traditional R&D resources, which was covered in the previous 
section.   
In much the same way it approached the expected benefit of tapping into 
commercial R&D resources, DOD generally offers no quantified measures of benefit 
number two either.  However, the new requirement for Agreement Officers to track non-
traditional supplier participation from FY 2001 forward will provide DOD a quantified 
measure for number two in the future.  Merely tracking the number of non-traditional 
companies participating in OT-based relationships with DOD does not provide enough 
information necessary to appropriately analyze an OT’s ability to attract non-traditional 
company participation.  For example, a simple statement such as “DOD’s total number of 
OT agreements in a period involved ‘XX’ percentage of non-traditional companies” does 
not tell the entire story.  Without further analysis, the conclusion might erroneously be 
made that an increase in that percentage over the next period meant that OTs were being 
used more successfully to attract non-traditional companies.  The implied suggestion is 
that it was the OT that attracted the non-traditional company.  This very well might not 
be the case. 
Survey question nine asked respondents to indicate if there were specific 
provisions in the OT that enabled their participation in a business relationship with DOD.  
While it’s true that an overwhelming majority (71 percent) answered “yes,” the fact that 
29 percent answered “no” provides enough grounds for further investigation and could 
lead one to believe that the OT itself does not always attract non-traditional companies.  
There might very well be other reasons why those companies chose to pursue defense 
business, which implies that they would have participated in a relationship with DOD 
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regardless of whether an OT was used or not.  The reason why it is so important for DOD 
to identify these reasons is so that Agreement Officers can better understand what in fact 
motivates non-traditional companies to pursue defense business, and thus allow them to 
more frequently include these motivators in their OTs. 
Survey question 10 was a follow-on question for those respondents that answered 
“yes” to the previous question.  Question 10 asked the companies which stated there were 
specific provisions of the OT that enabled their participation in the relationship to 
identify those provisions.  The point of this question was to determine what part of the 
OTs changed their mind about participating in the defense market, that is to identify what 
barriers were overcome as a result of the OT.  Given this information, a comparison 
could then be made between the stated barriers and the most common barriers reported in 
DOD studies.   
Interestingly enough, every company’s answer but two was different.  
Additionally, the specific answers they provided did not completely match with the most 
commonly cited barriers to pursuing defense business.  As identified in Chapter III, the 
intellectual property rights clauses found in traditional FAR-type contracts are the 
Government regulation that companies most frequently cite as their reason for refusing 
Government R&D contracts.  [Ref. 32: p. 18]  However, only 20 percent of the 
respondents in this survey identified intellectual property rights clauses as the specific 
clause that enabled their participation in the OT agreement.  Given the diversity in 
answers, one might be led to believe that different non-traditional companies have very 
different reasons (meaning barriers) for not participating in the defense market.   
DOD’s third most frequently cited expected benefit to using OTs--flexibility in 
negotiating terms and conditions--almost always refers specifically to an OT’s ability to 
give DOD flexibility while negotiating Intellectual Property (IP) rights.  [Ref. 6: p. 12]  
In the eyes of many DOD officials, flexibility in negotiating IP rights is a key 
determinant to whether DOD can attract non-traditional firms to do business with them or 
not.  For example, an Agreement Officer made the following comment in DOD’s FY 99 
OT report to Congress:  
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Had the Other Transaction Authority not been available, it is doubtful that 
DOD could have accessed this technology so affordably.  This company is 
extremely cautious about intellectual property rights.  A traditional contract 
that invoked a Bayh-Dole compliant patent term would doubtless have been 
rejected or unaffordable.  [Ref. 41] 
  Ironically, GAO revealed in their 2000 OT report that DOD Agreement Officers 
incorporated standard FAR-type IP clauses into OTs more frequently than any other type 
of clause.  [Ref. 6: p. 20]  As already mentioned, DOD officials frequently speculate, but 
ultimately have no quantifiable proof that their flexibility in negotiating IP rights actually 
attracted non-traditional firms.  Additionally, only 20 percent of the researcher’s survey 
respondents identified this issue as the reason why they chose to pursue defense business.  
One of two possibilities might explain this phenomenon.  Either DOD is not utilizing the 
flexibility that is afforded to them (by incorporating standard FAR-type IP clauses) or 
DOD’s inability to negotiate flexible IP rights is not as significant a barrier to conducting 
defense business as originally thought.  Of course, further research would be required in 
order to prove this. 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, there already exists much data regarding 
DOD’s views on the benefit of having Section 845 authority.  However, there is very 
little data regarding the OT participants’ views of DOD benefits.  Survey Question 14 
was aimed specifically at gathering data on this issue by asking the non-traditional 
companies to identify what benefits they thought DOD obtained from the OT-based 
relationship.  The results of this question reveal that 67 percent of the respondents 
thought DOD benefited by gaining access to better, faster and cheaper technology.   
These views fall directly in line with DOD’s most often cited benefit and the 
legislation’s most recently published intent.  But these data also contradict the quantified 
results from survey Question 11, which revealed that DOD gained significantly greater 
access to non-traditional R&D resources in only 33 percent of the cases.  Again, this only 
views the issue from a quantitative perspective and not a qualitative perspective.  It is 
quite possible for DOD to gain better, faster and cheaper technology by accessing only a 
small percentage of a company’s R&D resources.  It is the value to DOD of the R&D 
obtained that is truly important, not the amount. 
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D. AGREEMENT STRUCTURE  
OT agreements are most easily defined by stating what they are not.  As cited in 
Chapter II, OTs are not contracts, grants or cooperative agreements.  Therefore, they are 
not constrained by the traditional statutes and regulations that frame FAR-based 
contracts.  This lack of constraint provides Agreement Officers tremendous freedom and 
flexibility when they are crafting OTs.  Clearly, this flexibility was intended to give 
Agreement Officers the ability to best tailor the agreement to the situation.   
The previous section discussed how DOD officials routinely cited this flexibility 
as one of the most popular benefits to using the authority.  An Agreement Officer was 
quoted as follows in DOD’s FY 2000 OT report to Congress.  
Utilizing an OT for this requirement resulted in beneficial results to the Navy 
in that an IPT environment was created between DOD and industry.  
Traditional FAR and DFAR clauses and requirements would have restricted 
contractor flexibility in proceeding under the resultant agreement.  [Ref. 41]   
DOD officials also commonly stated that their freedom to craft a tailored agreement is 
what most often gave the Government the ability to attract non-traditional companies to 
the defense market.  In a December 1996 memorandum, DUSD (AT&L) acknowledged 
that DOD officials would be operating in an unstructured environment when negotiating 
Section 845 OTs, but also commented that his expectations were for Agreement Officers 
to incorporate good business sense and appropriate safeguards to protect DOD’s interests.  
[Ref. 6: p. 19]   
 Despite having flexibility to tailor OT agreements to better address unique project 
issues, GAO found in their 2000 report on DOD’s use of OTs that DOD’s agreements 
used approaches that varied little in most areas.  For example, GAO found that regardless 
of the type of contractor, the agreement’s value or the recipient’s contribution of financial 
resources, many of DOD’s Section 845 agreements addressed the financial management, 
termination and dispute processes, IP rights, Government property administration, and 
subcontractor management areas much like in standard FAR-based contracts.  [Ref. 6: p. 
19]  GAO also highlighted in a 2001 report on OTA that DOD’s analysis supporting its 
selection of OT agreement structures did not address why either the standard contract 
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provision or a tailored approach was selected, nor did it discuss the anticipated benefits of 
the structure selected.  [Ref. 44: p. 9] 
One possible explanation, according to GAO, of DOD’s consistent use of 
standard contract provisions in its agreement structures is that Agreement Officers are too 
often relying on example OT agreement models to help them formulate their individual 
agreements.  In fact, GAO found in its review of DOD’s Section 845 agreements that the 
basis for many of the agreements was a model developed by DARPA.  More specifically, 
GAO determined that DOD’s reliance on this model is what contributed to the uniformity 
observed in its approaches to OT agreement structure.  [Ref. 6: p. 24]  DARPA’s model, 
however, was developed for use on its dual-use technology assistance agreements.  
Consequently, DARPA officials structured the terms and conditions of their model to 
reflect the unique nature of these situations.  [Ref. 6: p. 24]  Clearly, DARPA did not 
intend the model to be used in all cases.   
DOD Agreement Officers’ reliance on model agreements while crafting their OTs 
may seem practical, but more than likely led to agreements that were not tailored to 
address each relationship’s unique issues.  Section 845 OTA was developed to give DOD 
a tool to attract high tech companies from all different industries and markets that 
previously did not participate in defense business.  With that in mind, it is not hard to 
imagine that the kind of companies DOD is trying to attract find different reasons for 
pursing new business.   
Survey question 16 asked the non-traditional respondents to list areas their 
company feels are the most important to consider when evaluating whether to pursue a 
business relationship with a new customer or establish ground in a new market.  The idea 
behind this question was to discover what motivates non-traditional companies to pursue 
new business.  Not surprisingly, the survey respondents gave a variety of different 
answers to the question.  Responses such as profit potential, market potential, retaining IP 
rights, return on investment, as well as many others were given.  Based on these results, it 
is more than obvious that each company has its own unique requirements that must be 
met before it pursues new business. Obviously the traditional DOD contracting approach 
does not satisfy their requirements, or they would’ve already been operating in the 
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defense market.  Therefore, using a standard approach to structuring OT agreements 
violates the very spirit of the authority.  OTA affords DOD the flexibility to craft 
business arrangements that are tailored to the unique circumstances of the situation.  The 
non-traditional companies that DOD is trying to attract are already operating in 
commercial markets and are used to entering into business relationships that satisfy the 
unique needs of both parties.  If DOD is going to entice these companies to pursue 
defense business, it must learn to capitalize on the flexibility that OTA provides and 
structure unique business arrangements accordingly. 
As previously mentioned, each company responded to question 16 in a variety of 
ways.  There was, however, one common theme amongst them.  One hundred percent of 
the respondents included “the potential for a long-term relationship” (or a derivation 
thereof) as a major consideration when deciding whether to pursue new business or not.  
This theme has serious implications for DOD and its use of Section 845 OTs as a viable 
method for attracting non-traditional companies.   
DUSD’s (AT&L) 2000 OT Guide encourages DOD to pursue follow-on 
competition utilizing fixed-price type traditional contracts after the OT-based relationship 
is concluded.  On the one hand, non-traditional companies are saying that the potential 
for a long-term relationship must be there in order for them to be encouraged to pursue 
new business.  Additionally, the traditional DOD contracting arrangements more than 
likely presented significant enough barriers to them entering the defense market, or one 
could imagine that they would have already been participating in defense business.  But 
on the other hand, DOD is encouraging these companies to compete for follow-on 
business that more than likely will involve traditional contracts.  In order to compete for 
the follow-on business opportunities, these companies would most likely have to give up 
many IP rights, which it has already been established they are unwilling to do. 
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter presented and analyzed various themes regarding DOD’s use of 
Section 845 OTs as a method for attracting non-traditional companies and accessing their 
technology resources.  Issues were raised concerning the type of non-traditional 
companies that DOD actually attracted using OTs, the methods used to attract them, 
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DOD’s benefits gained by utilizing OTs and the ways in which DOD Agreement Officers 
have been structuring the arrangements.   
As Chapter II previously discussed, DOD lobbied for OTA so that it could 
penetrate the world’s most advanced defense-untapped commercial markets and gain 
access to their leading edge technology.  Penetrating these markets and accessing the 
technology is not a “one shot” deal.  If the commercial companies that own the world’s 
most advanced technology are going to be enticed to pursue defense business, they must 
be given the proper incentive.  It is no secret that it costs a significant amount of money 
for a company to operate a defense division.  Right now, many non-traditional companies 
neither need nor want defense business.  If OTs are going to accomplish their mission of 
attracting non-traditional companies, they must be marketed heavily to the untapped 
markets and to the most advanced companies, be structured appropriately to reflect each 
relationship’s unique requirements and allow for longer term OT-based relationships.   
The following and concluding chapter will present conclusions and 
recommendations, provide answers to the researcher’s principal research questions, and 
suggest areas for further research.    
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this study was to analyze DOD’s use of Section 845 OTA with 
respect to the legislation’s intent.  This final chapter will provide the researcher’s 
principal conclusions, which are derived from data accumulated and analyzed from a 
survey that was distributed among non-traditional companies who participated in an OT-
based defense business relationship.   Chapter VI will also present recommendations 
based on the principal conclusions, provide answers to the research questions posed in 
Chapter I and suggest OTA areas for further research. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
The data presented in Chapter IV and subsequently analyzed in Chapter V lead 
this researcher to draw several conclusions.  While these conclusions cover a broad range 
of issues related to DOD’s use of Section 845 OTA, they are presented in descending 
order from macro to micro issues. 
#1.  There exists a significant amount of confusion within the Federal 
Government as to what constitutes a non-traditional company. 
DOD officials delegated the responsibility for defining the term non-traditional 
company as it applies to Section 845 OTs to the Director of Defense Procurement (DDP).  
As stated previously in Chapter IV, DDP defines a non-traditional company according to 
the following definition: 
A business unit that has not, for a period of at least one year prior to the date 
of the OT agreement, entered into or performed on (1) any procurement 
contract that is subject to full coverage under the cost accounting standards 
prescribed pursuant to Section 26 of the Office of Federal Procurement 
Policy Act (41 U.S.C. 422) and the regulations implementing such section; or 
(2) any other procurement contract in excess of $500,000 to carry out 
prototype projects or to perform basic, applied, or advanced research projects 
for a Federal agency.  [Ref. 4: DL1.12] 
While it is very clear that DDP intended for this definition to apply to companies that 
have not participated in any Federal Government markets within the last year, survey data 
results seem to contradict this fact.  Seventy one percent of the survey respondents 
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indicate they had done business with other Federal Agencies prior to entering into their 
OT agreement with DOD.  However, the researcher submitted surveys only to companies 
that were classified according to DDP as non-traditional companies.  Additionally, 
Chapter V cited several instances where Agreement Officers referred in a DOD annual 
report to Congress to their OT’s participants as traditional defense suppliers, yet DDP 
characterized those same suppliers as non-traditional and tracked their participation as 
such.   
Chapter V highlights the fact that in their 2000 report entitled DOD’s Guidance 
on Using Section 845 Agreements Could be Improved, GAO raised this issue as well.  
Specifically, it is pointed out that DOD’s Inspector General (DODIG) independently 
collected non-traditional company participation in Section 845 OT statistics, but defined 
a non-traditional company as one that had not performed research on cost-based contracts 
or that had been subject to an audit by the Defense Contract Audit Agency within the past 
three years.  Obviously, this definition represents a dramatically different interpretation 
of a non-traditional company than DDP’s and therefore, would result in dramatically 
different non-traditional participation rate statistics if it were applied. 
#2.  Many of the non-traditional companies participating in OT-based 
relationships with DOD are from markets where significant defense business 
already exists. 
This study’s survey respondents were asked to characterize their companies’ 
positions relative to their primary competitors according to the level of DOD business the 
companies were conducting.  One hundred percent of the respondents indicated they were 
one of several companies within their competitive market that was conducting business 
with DOD.  These results completely contradict the belief that the non-traditional 
companies DOD is attracting with OTs are coming from untapped industries and markets.  
Given this fact, one could question whether the technology to which DOD gained access 
as a result of these OT-based relationships could have been obtained from any of the 
other companies with which DOD was already doing business in those same markets.   
The fact that 100 percent of the survey respondents categorized themselves as one 
of several companies operating in their competitive market that was doing business with 
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DOD may not be surprising considering the way that DOD markets its Section 845 OTs.  
Chapter V pointed out that in several of the comment sections in DOD’s annual report to 
Congress on its use of OTs, Agreement Officers explicitly stated that they attracted the 
non-traditional company using a Broad Agency Announcement (BAA) or Commerce 
Business Daily (CBD) solicitation.  It stands to reason that companies operating in 
predominantly defense markets are going to be reading the “traditional” defense 
solicitations.  Likewise, the companies that are operating in the untapped DOD markets 
are operating in their own unique circles and probably are not going to be reading 
publications such as the CBD or noticing BAAs. 
A question in the survey’s demographics section asked respondents to 
approximate their companies’ average annual R&D budget over the last five years.  Only 
29 percent of the respondents had annual R&D budgets of one million dollars or more.  
Additionally, the remaining 71 percent had annual internal R&D budgets of under a half 
million dollars.  In terms of today’s high technology dominated industries, these annual 
R&D budgets represent very small numbers.  These facts, combined with the survey 
results that indicated DOD was attracting companies from markets where significant 
defense business already exists, provide enough evidence to suggest that OTs are not 
attracting the right kind of non-traditional companies. 
#3.  DOD achieved varied success in using OTs to tap into non-traditional 
R&D resources. 
As mentioned numerous times throughout this thesis, DOD’s most frequently 
stated primary expected benefit from using Section 845 OTA is to give it access to more 
non-traditional R&D resources.  Congress placed it in the legislation’s language.  DUSD 
(AT&L) stated it in its most current OT regulatory document.  And, GAO identified it in 
a 2000 report as DOD’s most often cited expected benefit.    
Yet, given all of the publicity that this expected benefit received, DOD has not 
identified any quantifiable evidence to measure how successful it has been at achieving 
this benefit.  Chapter IV identified and discussed data pertaining to how many non-
traditional companies participated with DOD in OT-based relationships.  However, data 
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pertaining to how much of the non-traditional R&D resources were tapped into has never 
been quantified or tracked.   
Chapter V highlighted the fact that DUSD’s (AT&L) April 2000 OT Guide 
established a new requirement for Agreement Officers to track as a metric the 
involvement of non-traditional contractors that participate to a significant extent in a 
prototype project administered using an OT.  However, this metric is intended only to 
indicate that a company is non-traditional so that DOD’s success rate of attracting non-
traditional companies using OTs can be more easily quantified and tracked.  Again, this 
does nothing to address the more important question regarding how much of the non-
traditional companies’ R&D resources DOD was able to tap into using the OT. 
 In an effort to actually address this idea, survey question 11 asked the non-
traditional respondents to identify the percentage of their companies’ R&D efforts that 
DOD had access to both before and after the OT-based business relationship was formed.  
Exactly half of the respondents stated that DOD had access to 90 percent of their 
companies’ technology both before and after their participation in the OT agreement.  
Clearly, the OT had no impact on the amount of non-traditional R&D resources to which 
DOD had access in these situations.  Additionally, only in 33 percent of the cases did 
DOD have access to a significantly greater amount of the companies’ R&D resources 
after the OT-based relationship was formed.  One other interesting fact exists regarding 
the 50 percent of the cases in which the OT had no impact on DOD’s ability to tap into 
non-traditional R&D resources.  Every one of these companies indicated they had 
participated in business relationships with other Government agencies prior to their OT 
relationship with DOD.  It is quite possible that these companies are only non-traditional 
by definition, and actually have been operating in the defense market before (just not in 
the last year). 
#4.  Every OT-based relationship is unique in that non-traditional companies 
pursue defense business for very different reasons. 
DUSD (AT&L) established a new requirement in FY 2001 for Agreement 
Officers to track, as a metric, non-traditional company participation in OT-based 
relationships. Clearly this will provide defense officials statistics as to the participation 
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rate of non-traditional companies in OT-based relationships.  However, the challenge still 
exists for defense officials to determine if it was the OT that enticed the non-traditional 
companies to pursue defense business in the first place. 
Survey question nine asked respondents to indicate if there were specific 
provisions in the OT that enabled their participation in a business relationship with DOD.  
An overwhelming majority (71 percent) answered “yes,” meaning that there were specific 
provisions in the OT arrangement that enticed them to pursue defense business.  
Regarding the remaining 29 percent that answered “no,” there might very well be other 
reasons why those companies chose to pursue defense business.  Consequently, one could 
conclude that these companies might have participated in a relationship with DOD 
regardless of whether an OT was used or not.  The reason why it is so important for DOD 
to identify these reasons is so that Agreement Officers can better understand what in fact 
motivates non-traditional companies to pursue defense business, and thus allow them to 
more frequently include these motivators in their OTs. 
Survey question 10 was a follow-on question for those respondents that answered 
“yes” to the previous question.  Question 10 asked the companies which stated there were 
specific provisions of the OT that enabled their participation in the relationship to 
identify those provisions.  The point of this question was to determine what part of the 
OTs changed their mind about participating in the defense market.  Simply put, this was 
intended to identify what barriers were overcome as a result of the OT.  Given this 
information, a comparison could then be made between the stated barriers and the most 
common barriers reported in DOD studies.   
Interestingly enough, every company’s answer but two was different.  
Additionally, the specific answers they provided did not completely match with the most 
commonly cited barriers to pursuing defense business.  As identified in Chapter III, the 
intellectual property rights clauses found in traditional FAR-type contracts are the 
Government regulation that companies most frequently cite as their reason for refusing 
Government R&D contracts.  However, only 20 percent of the respondents in this survey 
identified intellectual property rights clauses as the specific clause that enabled their 
participation in the OT agreement.  Given the diversity in answers, one might be led to 
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believe that different non-traditional companies have very different reasons for pursuing 
defense business.  
Survey question 16 asked the non-traditional respondents to list areas their 
company feels are the most important to consider when evaluating whether to pursue a 
business relationship with a new customer or establish ground in a new market.  The idea 
behind this question was to discover what motivates non-traditional companies to pursue 
new business.  Not surprisingly, the survey respondents gave a variety of answers to the 
question.  Responses such as profit potential, market potential, retaining IP rights, return 
on investment, as well as many others were given.  Based on these results, it is obvious 
that each company has a set of unique requirements that must be met before it pursues 
new business.  Apparently, the traditional DOD contracting approach does not satisfy the 
companies’ requirements, or they would already have been participating in the defense 
market prior to their OT agreement.  Therefore, using a standard approach to structuring 
OT agreements violates the spirit of the authority.  OTA affords DOD the flexibility to 
craft business arrangements that are tailored to the unique circumstances of the situation.  
The non-traditional companies that DOD is trying to attract are already operating in 
commercial markets and are used to entering into business relationships that satisfy the 
unique needs of both parties.  If DOD is going to entice these companies to pursue 
defense business, it must learn to capitalize on the flexibility that OTA provides and 
structure unique business arrangements accordingly. 
#5.  DOD Agreement Officers are not tailoring OT agreements to match the 
unique circumstances of each OT-based business relationship. 
OT agreements are most easily defined by stating what they are not.  As cited in 
Chapter II, OTs are not contracts, grants or cooperative agreements.  Therefore, they are 
not constrained by the traditional statutes and regulations that frame FAR-based 
contracts.  This lack of constraint provides Agreement Officers tremendous freedom and 
flexibility when they are crafting OTs.  Clearly, this flexibility was intended to give 
Agreement Officers the ability to best tailor the agreement to the situation.   
Despite having flexibility to tailor OT agreements to better address unique project 
issues, GAO found in their 2000 report on DOD’s use of OTs that DOD’s agreements 
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used approaches that varied little in most areas.  Chapter V discussed how GAO found 
that regardless of the type of contractor, the agreement’s value or the recipient’s 
contribution of financial resources, many of DOD’s Section 845 agreements addressed 
the financial management, termination and dispute processes, IP rights, Government 
property administration, and subcontractor management areas much like in standard 
FAR-based contracts.  Chapter V also revealed that DOD’s analysis supporting its 
selection of OT agreement structures did not address why either the standard contract 
provision or a tailored approach was selected, nor did it discuss the anticipated benefits of 
the structure selected.   
One possible explanation of DOD’s consistent use of standard contract provisions 
in its agreement structures is that Agreement Officers are too often relying on model OT 
agreements to help them formulate their individual agreements.  In fact, Chapter V 
discussed how DOD used a model developed by DARPA as the basis for many of its 
agreements and it was DOD’s reliance on this model that contributed to the uniformity 
observed in its approaches to OT agreement structure.  Chapter V also noted that 
DARPA’s model was originally developed for use on its dual-use technology assistance 
agreements.  Consequently, DARPA officials structured the terms and conditions of their 
model to reflect the unique nature of these situations.  Clearly, DARPA did not intend its 
OT model agreement to be utilized in all cases.   
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
#1.  Develop and apply within the Federal Government a consistent 
definition of what constitutes a non-traditional company. 
Congress requires DOD to report annually on its usage of OTA.  Until recently, 
Agreement Officers’ input needed only to answer a few generic questions regarding their 
lessons learned from the experience and their perspective on the extent to which the OT 
agreement contributed to a broadening of the Defense Technology and Industrial Base.  
Considering that OTA is a temporary authority given to the Department, Congress 
undoubtedly intended to use DOD’s annual report to assist them in making a 
determination whether the authority was living up to its legislative intent (and whether 
the authority should be extended). 
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Periodically over the last five years, various DOD and legislative officials tasked 
other Government organizations to perform independent assessments as to whether 
DOD’s use of Section 845 was living up to its legislative intent or not.  Ironically, these 
organizations encountered difficulty in comparing their results to DOD’s.  Further 
research revealed that their difficulties stemmed from the fact that their definition of a 
non-traditional company varied greatly from DOD’s.   
If both Congress and DOD desire to appropriately measure the authority’s ability 
to live up to its legislative intent, they must first establish a common means by which to 
measure.  Specifically, this means that those who use the authority, as well as those who 
monitor its use, must agree on a common definition of a non-traditional company.  
However, above and beyond the basic need for finding consensus amongst all parties, 
legislative and DOD officials must develop a definition that appropriately captures the 
true spirit of the legislation’s intent.    
#2.  Identify the untapped commercial markets and industries that contain 
the most advanced technologies and aggressively advertise DOD’s OTA using 
commercial-style marketing  approaches.   
 Chapters IV and V provided analysis regarding the types of non-traditional 
companies DOD attracted with its OTs.  Chapter III discussed trends in private industry 
R&D.  The researcher concluded from the survey data that DOD is attracting non-
traditional companies from markets where there already exists a significant amount of 
defense business.  Yet discussions in Chapter III imply that the R&D and technology that 
DOD really needs access to is located in markets and industries that it has not yet tapped.   
DOD currently solicits OT participation using the same means it uses to solicit 
traditional contract business.  By using this process, DOD is relying upon the firms that 
respond to their solicitations.  As the survey data results suggest, only non-traditional 
firms from already accessed defense markets are responding to DOD’s solicitations.  The 
non-traditional companies that own a large percentage of the world’s most advanced 
technology are currently operating in “untapped” commercial markets and are more than 
likely entirely unaware of emerging defense business. 
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Rather than rely on the companies to come to it, DOD must identify the specific 
markets and industries in which it wants to establish new ground and aggressively 
advertise to all participants the flexibility that OTA affords both the Government and the 
OT participants.  Additionally, DOD must identify and use the most appropriate 
commercial style of advertising for the specific industries or markets it’s targeting.              
#3.  Develop a method for analyzing and tracking DOD’s success at using 
OTs to tap into non-traditional R&D resources. 
DUSD (AT&L) recently established a new requirement for DOD Agreement 
Officers to track the participation of non-traditional companies in their OT agreements.  
The purpose behind this requirement is to allow DOD to better “answer the mail” when it 
comes time for it to justify the authority’s existence to Congress.  Clearly, this new 
requirement will assist DOD officials in determining how well the authority is living up 
to the half of its legislative intent which is to attract non-traditional companies to 
participate in defense business.  However, this new requirement offers no help in 
determining whether the authority is living up to the other half of its legislative intent, 
which is to provide DOD a tool to access the non-traditional companies’ R&D resources.  
Currently, there is no method established for measuring success in achieving this goal. 
In order for DOD officials to truly determine how well OTA is fulfilling its 
legislative intent, they must first gather all of the relevant facts.  One extremely relevant 
fact is the amount of R&D resources DOD was able to attract during each OT-based 
relationship.  Therefore, DOD officials must develop an appropriate method for 
measuring the amount of non-traditional R&D/technology accessed and use this 
information to analyze whether this valuable tool is being used properly or not.     
#4.  Perform robust market research efforts on the untapped non-traditional 
markets and industries being targeted by OTA in an effort to determine what will 
entice those market and industry participants to pursue defense business. 
The flexibility OTA affords DOD means nothing unless it is used properly.  When 
using this authority, Agreement Officers have the powerful ability to tailor individual 
agreements to meet the unique circumstances of that relationship.  Many studies have 
been conducted to identify any barriers that might exist which are preventing non-
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traditional companies from pursuing defense business.  Chapter IV presented data that 
suggests that each non-traditional company has its own unique set of barriers that must be 
overcome before they are encouraged enough to pursue a new market or customer.    
An earlier recommendation discussed DOD’s need to gain access to the untapped 
markets that contain the world’s most advanced technology.  In order to accomplish this, 
DOD must first understand what motivates the participants in these markets to pursue 
new business.  Armed with this knowledge, Agreement Officers can then aggressively 
pursue relationships with these participants by offering OT agreements that satisfy their 
unique requirements. 
#5.  Educate Agreement Officers on how to develop and tailor “world class” 
commercial-style business arrangements that best match the unique circumstances 
of each business relationship. 
Chapter V discussed DOD Agreement Officers’ tendency to rely on models when 
crafting their OT structure.  OTA was developed in order to give the Department the 
flexibility to tailor arrangements to match agreements with the unique circumstances of 
each relationship.  Conclusions drawn in earlier sections of this chapter indicate that non-
traditional companies require this sort of flexibility in their business arrangements before 
they are encouraged to pursue new customers.  Yet Agreement Officers continue to 
restrict the flexibility of their agreements by incorporating standard FAR-type contract 
provisions into their OTs. 
Evidence exists to support the conclusion that Agreement Officers are relying too 
heavily on models when developing agreements.  However, almost no evidence exists as 
to why this is occuring.  One possible answer is that Agreement Officers simply are not 
experienced enough in commercial style business arrangements to know how to 
appropriately craft one.  No tool is worth anything unless it is used properly.  If DOD is 
to truly become a “world class” buyer in the high technology non-traditional markets, 
Agreement Officers must have the ability to craft “world class” commercial-style 
business arrangements that accurately match the situation.  Training Agreement Officers 
how to develop an OT agreement according to a model is not the answer in this case.  
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Rather, Agreement Officers must be educated on commercial-style business operations 
and must acquire experience at developing them. 
D. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This section provides brief answers to the primary and subsidiary thesis research 
questions posed in Chapter I. 
1.  To what extent has Other Transaction Authority allowed Department of 
Defense to attract non-traditional suppliers and tap into their previously 
unavailable research and development and technology efforts? 
DOD and DARPA combined administered 245 new Section 845 OTs from FY 
1994 through FY 2000.  [Ref. 42]  Figure 4, Chapter II, provided the specific breakdown 
of the number of new Section 845 OTs administered per fiscal year during this same 
period.  According to DUSD’s (AT&L) Section 845 OT database, 85 (35 percent) of the 
245 new OT agreements involved non-traditional participants.  [Ref. 42]  These 85 new 
OT agreements that involved non-traditional company participants were the “fixed pool” 
of companies to which the researcher targeted the surveys.   
DOD has not identified any quantifiable evidence to measure how successful it 
has been at tapping into non-traditional R&D resources.  In an effort to actually address 
this idea, survey question 11 asked the non-traditional respondents to identify the 
percentage of their companies’ R&D efforts to which DOD had access both before and 
after the OT-based business relationship was formed.  Exactly half of the respondents 
stated that DOD had access to 90 percent of their companies’ technology both before and 
after their participation in the OT agreement.  Clearly, the OT had no impact on the 
amount of non-traditional R&D resources to which DOD had access in these situations.  
Additionally, only in 33 percent of the cases did DOD have access to a significantly 
greater amount of the companies’ R&D resources after the OT-based relationship was 
formed.  One other interesting fact exists regarding the 50 percent of the cases in which 
the OT had no impact on DOD’s ability to tap into non-traditional R&D resources.  Every 
one of these companies indicated they had participated in business relationships with 
other Government agencies prior to their OT relationship with DOD.   
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2.  What is the trend in DOD’s investment in R&D over the last decade and 
how does it compare to private industry’s investment trends in R&D? 
Chapter III revealed that FY 2001 marked an all time high (in inflation adjusted 
terms) in total Federal R&D spending over the last quarter century.  In 1976, the 
Government spent less than $60 billion (in today’s adjusted dollars) as compared to the 
$85 billion budgeted for FY 2001.  While one may guess that there was a smooth upward 
linear path between these two points, that is far from the case.  The relative split between 
defense and non-defense R&D spending has also changed over the years.   
Times have changed significantly since 1976, when a professional science 
organization christened the first edition of their association magazine with the following 
opening line: “The Federal Government holds most of the high cards which determine the 
thrust and priorities of scientific research and development effort in the United States.”  
[Ref. 35: pp. 6-7]  Since then, a dramatic shift in the composition of total national R&D 
spending has occurred.  In 1980, private industry first exceeded Federal Government 
spending on R&D.  Since then (with the exception of DOD’s peak spending level in 
1987), the gap between Government and private spending for R&D continued to grow.  
In 1999, private industry accounted for 68.5 percent of total U.S. R&D and the Federal 
share has continued to decline.   
3.  Why is it important that DOD gain greater access to commercial R&D 
and technology resources? 
In order to ensure our nation’s security and remain globally dominant in this new 
era, DOD must have access to the most superior technology on the planet.  As opposed to 
a decade ago when DOD funded and controlled the most cutting edge technology, today 
commercial companies operating in commercial markets hold much of the world’s 
superior technology.  DOD simply does not have the resources today to fund comparable 
technology themselves.  Consequently, DOD is forced to rely on these commercial 
markets to satisfy its demand for the rapid insertion of superior technology into weapon 
systems at an affordable price.  Yet studies suggest that significant barriers exist that 
prevent commercial industry from seeking business with the Government.  Therein lies 
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the dilemma; in order to survive, DOD must tap into the technology held by commercial 
firms that neither need nor want their business.   
4.  According to DOD, what are the most commonly perceived barriers to 
attracting non-traditional suppliers to the Government Acquisition market? 
Chapter II described how OTA was developed with the intent of providing DOD 
the flexibility to negotiate business relationship terms and agreements without the 
restrictions imposed by traditional FAR clauses.  DOD officials and legislators 
envisioned Section 845 OTA being used to allow firms to conduct business with the 
Government without changing any of their current practices or processes.  Chapter III 
revealed the fact that companies organize to do business in either the defense sector or 
the commercial sector, but rarely do both under one administrative roof.  Commercial 
divisions respond to market conditions, whereas the Defense divisions typically respond 
to military programs and budget cycles.  Maintaining such dramatically separate 
operations is extremely costly and is only done when it makes good business sense.   
Chapter III discussed how traditional DOD contracts usually regulate profit in 
some respect, even when it’s a cost-type contract involving heavy R&D.  In contrast, 
most high-technology private industry companies recover their investment in R&D 
through large profits, then reinvest those profits in the next generation product.   
Traditional defense contractors, on the other hand, are able to survive on smaller profits 
because their R&D costs are typically recovered through terms of the contract.  In these 
cases the Government usually owns the data rights so that they can make the data 
package available to future bidders in an effort to promote future competition.  
Commercial companies that invest heavily in R&D do not subscribe to this process 
because they see it as offering their trade secrets to their competition.   
Chapter III discussed the fact that the intellectual property rights clauses found in 
traditional FAR-type contracts are the Government regulation that companies most 
frequently cite as their reason for refusing Government R&D contracts.  As it stands, the 
Government’s rights to hold patents and intellectual property (IP) represent the major 
barrier preventing commercial companies from performing R&D for the Government.  
Consequently, many of the world’s leading high technology companies bypass DOD 
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business because traditional DOD contracts prohibit them from using their innovations in 
future commercial products.   
5.  How do the non-traditional suppliers who have entered into business 
arrangements with DOD using Other Transactions perceive OTA as a means for 
overcoming these barriers? 
Survey question nine asked respondents to indicate if there were specific 
provisions in the OT that enabled their participation in a business relationship with DOD.  
A large majority (71 percent) answered “yes,” which meant that for these companies 
there were specific provisions in their OT agreement that encouraged them enough to 
pursue defense business.  Based on this fact, one can conclude that for these companies 
the OT reduced their barriers to participating in defense business.  
On the contrary, 29 percent of the respondents answered “no,” which provide 
enough grounds to warrant further investigation into whether there were other reasons 
those companies chose to pursue defense business.  If there were, it would imply that 
these companies would have participated in a relationship with DOD regardless of 
whether an OT was used or not.  Therefore, the OT itself did not reduce any barriers.  
The reason why it is so important for DOD to identify these reasons is so that Agreement 
Officers can better understand what in fact motivates non-traditional companies to pursue 
defense business, and thus allow them to more frequently include these motivators in 
their OTs. 
6.  From the non-traditional suppliers’ perspective, what general 
characteristics would a business arrangement need to contain in order to encourage 
them to allow DOD greater access to their R&D and technology efforts? 
Survey question 16 asked the non-traditional respondents to list areas their 
company feels are the most important to consider when evaluating whether to pursue a 
business relationship with a new customer or establish ground in a new market.  The idea 
behind this question was to discover what motivates non-traditional companies to pursue 
new business.  Chapter IV presented the survey respondents’ results and highlighted the 
fact that each company gave a variety of different answers to the question.  Specific 
responses such as profit potential, market potential, retaining IP rights, return on 
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investment, as well as many others were given.  Even though each company responded to 
question 16 in a variety of ways, there was one common theme amongst them.  One 
hundred percent of the respondents included “the potential for a long-term relationship” 
(or a derivation thereof) as a major consideration when deciding whether or not to pursue 
new business.  This theme has serious implications for DOD and its use of Section 845 
OTs as a viable method for attracting non-traditional companies.   
E. SUGGESTED AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH  
This study analyzed issues regarding DOD’s use of Section 845 OTA by 
soliciting data from non-traditional companies that participated in OT-based relationships 
with DOD.  Furthermore, this study concluded that many of the non-traditional 
companies with which DOD participated in OT-based relationships came from markets 
where significant defense business already existed.  Consequently, this researcher’s 
conclusions and recommendations were based on data gathered from companies 
operating in markets that have already been tapped by DOD.  One recommendation is to 
conduct a similar study that gathered views from highly advanced commercial companies 
which are operating in markets and industries untapped by DOD with a focus on 
determining if and how OTA could be used to successfully entice them to pursue defense 
business. 
This study also revealed that DOD Agreement Officers consistently applied 
standard FAR-type contractual provisions to their OT agreements and in general varied 
little in approaches to structuring their agreements.  Survey data support the conclusion 
that OT participants pursue defense business for very different reasons.  Consequently, 
Agreement Officers must have the ability to determine what uniquely motivates each of 
the non-traditional participants they are trying to attract and craft a “world class” business 
arrangement that appropriately satisfies all parties’ requirements.  As a result, this 
researcher recommends that Agreement Officers be provided with the education to fulfill 
these weighty responsibilities.  But what is appropriate education?  A second 
recommendation is to conduct a study to determine both the type of education that is 
necessary and a method for DOD to accomplish it. 
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Finally, survey data results led the researcher to conclude that DOD achieved 
varied success in its ability to use OTs to access non-traditional R&D resources.  DOD 
officials consistently claim victory in this category.  Yet DOD does not keep any 
quantifiable evidence to validate this claim.  DDP’s new requirement for tracking non-
traditional participation might give DOD officials insight into how successful OTs are at 
attracting non-traditional participants.  However, this requirement will not help to answer 
the more important question of how much of their research was attracted.  Currently no 
method to measure this has been developed.  A third recommendation is to conduct a 
study on how to gather these data and measure them.  Or more simply, conduct research 














APPENDIX A – INTRODUCTORY SURVEY LETTER AND 
QUESTIONAIRE 
Dear Business Partner, 
 
As a Master’s student attending the Naval Postgraduate School, I am conducting thesis 
research on the Department of Defense’s use of Other Transaction Authority.  Since 1994, the 
Department of Defense (DOD) has had a limited authority to enter into business relationships 
with private sector companies using agreement vehicles other than standard Government 
contracts, grants, or cooperative agreements.  These agreements, commonly referred to as Other 
Transactions (OT), are typically used for research and development (R&D) and prototype 
projects.  When DOD uses OTs as a contractual vehicle, they are essentially exempt from 
adhering to most Federal Government contractual statutes and regulations.   
 
Congress granted this authority to offer DOD greater flexibility in their efforts to 
leverage robust private industry R&D resources and to help reduce the barriers (as seen from the 
private sector company’s perspective) to conducting business with the Government.  Since given 
this authority, DOD has attempted to use Other Transactions as a method of attracting companies 
that for whatever reason would previously not conduct business with the Government.  DOD 
classifies such companies as  “Non-Traditional” suppliers.        
 
The focus of my research is to analyze the extent to which Other Transaction Authority 
has helped DOD in their efforts to attract these “Non-Traditional” suppliers.  According to my 
research, your organization entered into a business relationship with DOD (between the 
years 1995 and 2000) using an Other Transaction...and at the time of the agreement, your 
organization had not conducted any recent business with DOD, thus classifying your 
organization as a “Non-Traditional” supplier.  I have attached a short online survey that I am 
asking you to complete.  Once you have completed the survey and included any additional 
comments, just hit the send button.  It’s that easy!  I have also included a link that will lead you to 
some background information on Other Transaction Authority if you are interested. 
 
Your organization’s specific comments and survey data will remain entirely 
anonymous as a source of information in my study.  Therefore, you need not identify yourself.  
Because of your organization’s experience as a participant in an Other Transaction agreement, 
your opinions are extremely valuable.  Please feel free to contact me via e-mail with any 
questions or comments. 
 
Link to Survey: http://www.nps.navy.mil/spear/surveys/survey1.htm 
 
Other Transaction information: http://www.acq.osd.mil/dp/dsps/ot/otadescription.doc 
 
 
Thank you in advance for your time and comments! 
 
Lieutenant Commander John Gilliland 
Naval Postgraduate School 







This is an Official Survey of the Naval Postgraduate School 
Office of the Provost 
Monterey, CA 93943 
 
Survey of Industry Opinion of Other Transactions 
 
This survey is intended to solicit your ideas and comments regarding the 
Department of Defense's (DOD) use of Other Transactions (OT) as a method for 
attracting private industry Research and Development (R&D) and technology. The 
following questions are specifically targeted towards companies that previously had not 
conducted business with DOD, but chose to enter into a relationship with the Government 
for the first time using an OT as the vehicle. Please take a few moments to give us your 
honest appraisal and comments on DOD's use of OT's.  
1. What is your company's primary product or service?  
 
 
2. What is your company's primary industry?  
 
 
3. What is your company's approximate current annual sales volume?  
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Under $1,000,000  
$1,000,000 - $5,000,000  
$5,000,000 - $50,000,000  
$50,000,000 - $100,000,000  
Over $100,000,000  
 
4. What is the approximate average over the last 5 years of your company's 
annual R&D/technology budget?  
 
 
5. Was your company's participation in the Other Transaction...  
a one-to-one relationship involving only your company and DOD?  
a part of a consortium of companies participating in the Other Transaction 
with DOD?  
the result of a prime to sub constractor relationship your company had with 
another firm that was doing business with DOD?  
 
6. At the time your company participated in the Other Transaction 
relationship with DOD, how would you characterize your company's position with 
respect to the primary competitors in your industry?  
The only company amongst our competitive industry that was doing business 
with DOD.  
One of several companies within our competitive industry that was doing 
business with DOD.  
The only company within our competitive industry that was not doing 
business with DOD.  
 
7. Had your company ever done business with any other Federal 






8. Please cite the top five reasons why your company did not conduct 
business with DOD prior to the Other Transaction agreement (e.g., Government 
audit requirements, technical data rights, restrictions on foreign access to 
technology, burdensome paperwork, requirement to comply with cost accounting 
standards, etc.).  
 
 
9. Were there specific provisions of the Other Transactions agreement that 




10. If your answer to question #9 was yes, what were those specific 
provisions? (If answer was "no," proceed to question #11).  
 
 
11. In your estimation, what percentage of your company's total 
R&D/technology efforts did DOD have access to (e.g., in the form of the potential 
for off-the-shelf commercial product purchases) before a business relationship was 
formed using the Other Transaction agreement? After?  
 
 
12. Did the business relationship formed by the Other Transactions 




13. If your answer to question #12 was "yes," was the follow on business
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conducted using...  
tradtional Government procurement contracts  
additional Other Transaction agreements  
both traditional Government procurement contracts and Other Transaction 
agreements  
 
14. In your opinion, what benefits did DOD receive as a result of your 
company's participation in the Other Transactions agreement (e.g., unique 
commercial products or processes, better, cheaper or more readily available 
technology, etc.)?  
 
 
15. In what ways did the Other Transactions agreement mirror business 
relationships that your company had with the private industry customers that had 
the most access to your R&D/technology efforts?  
 
 
16. What areas does your company feel are the most important to consider 
when evaluating whether to pursue a business relationship with a new customer 
and/or establish ground in a new market? (for example, dollar size/profitability of 
the deal, potential for a long-term relationship, ease of negotiation, protection of 
technical data rights/proprietary information, ability to allow global access to 
technology, flexibility of business arrangement, etc.)  
 
 
Click Here to Send 
 
 
Return to the Home Page, without sending answers. 
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